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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION
Aspiring and significant regional powers have long played important roles, as in pre-revolutionary Iran’s role in the U.S Nixon Doctrine to assist the United States in carrying out its military commitments and to protect U.S interests in the Persian Gulf. After the Cold War and with
the end of superpower rivalry, regional powers have come into more prominence in emerging
complex conflict situations, such as those involved with destabilizing civil wars in Asia and Africa,
and regional developments have gained increasing importance. International Relations has seen a
resurgence of interest in the study of regional powers and IR scholars have been paying attention
to regional powers as they have important roles in world politics by affecting international-political
dynamics and outcomes. The central assumption behind this literature is that regional powers influence the interactions taking place at the regional level, involving both global powers and small
regional neighbors, and provide for regional order and thereby contribute to the stability of global
order.
The existing literature on regional powers focuses either on types, roles and foreign policy
strategies of regional powers (Neumann 1992; Katzenstein 2005; Destradi 2010; Nabers 2010;
Prys 2010) or regional structures, and security-related issues in the regional context (Lake and
Morgan 1997; Buzan & Waever 2003; Acharya and Johnston 2007; Hurrell 2007; Lake 2009;
Nolte 2011). More recently scholars have also started to focus on secondary and tertiary states,
those positioned as “middle powers” (able not so much individually but in concert with a small
enough number of states to affect the system with their resources) and small powers (not individually but with a large number of states able to impact the system) in the regional hierarchy along
with their responses to the regional hegemon (Jesse, Lobell, and Williams, 2012; 2015). When
applying hegemonic stability theory (HST) to the regional level, for example, political scientists
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have been interested more in an economic dimension rather than security policy, international organizations and cooperation (Liu and Ming-Te, 2011).
Given the increasing importance of regional systems with the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, which reduced systemic power competition that affected international outcomes and highlighted the importance of regions as relevant stages for the generation of system-level political
dynamics (Buzan & Waever 2003; Acharya 2007), this dissertation will study regional distributions of power and regional hegemons and regional great powers’ strategic tendencies and motivations in conflict and cooperation in the regional system. This study aims to offer an empirical
answer, for example, to the question of whether there are similarities in behaviors and motivations
of regional hegemons and global hegemon(s) in comparable situations, such as conflict and cooperation. I argue that even though regional systems operate under the global or extra-regional international system as a whole, and regional power hierarchy operates differently than the global
power hierarchy, still regional powers would be expected to show similar strategies and behaviors
in regional conflict and cooperation with global hegemons. The first step in this comparative analysis is to specify how hegemonic behavior and strategies are in general treated in the literature.
Overview of the Literature
To show how my research- focused on regional power behavior and motivations to understand regional hegemons’ and regional great powers’ strategies and behaviors in regional war and
peace by comparing them to global power behavior- contributes to the current literature and what
is missing in the existing literature, I will provide a brief discussion of existing literature on power
structure effects and hegemony’s behaviors and strategies.

3
The Debate on Power Structure and Effects on Conflict and Cooperation
The topic of distribution of power and how structure affects the international outcome (conflict or cooperation) have long been studied in international relations literature. Power hierarchies
have been studied in terms of conflict and cooperation at the regional level, and system-level theories have been applied to sub-system levels. Lemke (2010) has addressed the issue of cooperation
and conflict in regions and developed regional-level hypotheses from well-established IR theories
(power transition theory and HST) while undertaking statistical analysis to test his hypotheses. He
hypothesizes that the stronger a regional power, the fewer international conflicts it will have at the
regional level. He also hypothesizes that the greater the share of capabilities held by a regional
power, the greater the number of regional international organizations that region will enjoy. The
reasoning behind this assumption is based on hegemonic stability theory (Organski 1958, Kindleberger 1973, Gilpin 1981, Keohane 1984) and both Realist and Liberal assumptions which claim
that creation and maintenance of institutions are more likely with the existence of disproportionately powerful states since those states will lead the creation and maintenance of benefits and at
the same time costly institutions. There are two subfields within the HST literature. One subfield
of the theory focuses primarily on international economy (Kindleberger 1973, Ikenberry 2014)
while the other subfield focuses on the implications of hegemonic governance in increasing stable
cooperation in the international system (Keohane and Nye 1977; Gilpin 1983, 2001).
Gilpin (1983) proposes hegemonic governance as a broad theoretical notion and focuses on its
security implication. He argues that the existence of a hegemon fosters stability and peace. In
constructing his statistical analyses, Lemke (2010) uses independent variables based on regional
power’s share of hard power resources in the region: demographic share, economic share and military share. His dependent variables are number of military interstate disputes in the region and
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number of international organizations in the region. His statistical analysis shows that the regional
distribution of power strongly influences the amount of conflict the region have and also helps to
predict the number of regional international organizations in the region. These results support both
PTT and HST at the regional level.
Regional conflict and cooperation also have been studied per se by scholars whose studies
do not focus on distribution of power or power hierarchies. For instance, Solingen (2001) focuses
on the transition of Southeast Asian countries from conflict to cooperation during and after the
Cold War. She chooses Southeast Asian states as his case study because, she argues, despite Southeast Asia including a highly heterogeneous set of countries in terms of ethnicity, religion, language
and nationality, and also even though the region had economic and political crisis in the late 1990s,
still the region had a dramatic economic rise. Solingen’s study examines cooperation under a regional institution, ASEAN.
The Debate on Strategies of Global Hegemons
In hegemonic power literature, Charles Kindleberger’s study has an important place as a
starting point for other scholars to build on and develop explanations for the behavior of hegemonic
powers. Kindleberger (1973) refers to hegemony as the leadership position of a single country and
argues that single country provides public goods (or collective goods) to sustain stability of the
international system. Following hegemonic stability theorists (Kindleberger 1973; Keohane, 1980;
Gilpin, 1981), scholars have focused on different strategies such as economic sanctions, military
intervention, and foreign aid or military support, as pursued by hegemons to assert control over
other states and alter their incentives. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990a; 1990b) argue that there are
two basic ways of exercising hegemonic power: coercion and normative persuasion. In a coercion
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model of hegemonic power, a hegemonic nation exercises power through the manipulation of material incentives, which is “the use of threats and promises to alter preferences of leaders in secondary nations” (1990a, 283). According to this view, power is exercised through material resources, and by using promises of reward or threats punishment, hegemons alter the political and
economic incentives of other states and ensure that other states prefer cooperation to non-cooperation. The normative persuasion model, on the other hand, is based on socialization, which can
contribute to cooperation between the dominant state and secondary states through getting the
foreign elites “to buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore
pursue policies consistent with the hegemony’s notion of international order” (1990a, 283). In this
vein, both hard and soft power can be utilized for control.1
While pursuing the broad range of strategies available to them, hegemonic nations can,
therefore, exercise their power in benevolent or coercive forms. Cohn (2015) distinguishes three
models of hegemonic strategic form. (1) The benevolent form in which hegemon pursues general
benefits and absolute gains rather than its own benefits and relies on rewards rather than threats to
achieve its goals; (2) the mixed model where hegemons focus on both general as well as personal
benefits (both absolute and relative gains) and uses the combination of threats and rewards to ensure compliance of the secondary states; and (3) the exploitative (coercive) model in which
hegemon pursues only its self-interests as well as relative gain and relies on coercion to enforce
the cooperation of other states (63-65).

1

In one of his recent studies, in Future of Power (2011), Nye provides a full definition of
soft power and defines it as “the ability to affect others throughout the co-optive means of framing
the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes” (20-21).
Basically, soft power is the ability to persuade others to do what one wants through attraction and
co-option rather than through coercion and inducements.
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James and Lake (1989) who heavily focus on economic dimensions of hegemonic strategies, address the question of ‘how hegemonic leaders construct and maintain a liberal and open international economy’. They begin with the distinction between benevolent and coercive hegemony and
claim that “benevolent hegemony assumes that states share similar free trade preferences and are
stymied only by a collective action dilemma [while] coercive hegemony posits states with different
and often conflicting commercial interests” (4). They focus on coercive hegemony strategies since
constructing and maintaining a free trade regime is more difficult in a coercive hegemony than in
benevolent one, and they propose three separate strategies of hegemonic leadership, which they
call three faces of coercive hegemony. In the first face of coercive hegemony, similar to Ikenberry
and Kupchan’s (1990a, 1990b) argument, power is exercised through the hegemon’s use of positive and negative sanctions to influence foreign governments’ choice of policies, which might include military intervention or trade embargo. The second face focuses on the hegemon’s use of
international market power. Here, hegemon influences decisions in foreign countries by influencing consumer preferences and altering the constellation of interests and political power within
foreign countries in ways favorable to its own interests. The third face emphasizes the hegemon’s
use of ideas and ideology to influence public opinion and the political agenda in third countries
(4).
In addition to benevolent or coercive forms, hegemons can also exercise their power in
unilateral and multilateral forms. In this respect, the debate between unilateralists and multilateralists has important place on hegemonic power literature. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2011)
argue that “the process of multilateralism is one in which states view the solutions to problems as
requiring joint consultation, deliberation and decision” (182) while they define unilateralism as “a
formulation of policy without collective input” (184). In his article, Ikenberry (2003) distinguishes
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multilateralism from bilateralism and unilateralism. Accordingly, multilateralism is different from
other types of interstate relations in three ways.
First, because it [multilateralism] entails the coordination of relations among a group of
states, it can be contrasted with bilateral, “hub and spoke”, and imperial arrangements.
Second, the terms of a given relationship are defined by agreed-upon rules and principles—
and sometimes by organizations—so multilateralism can be contrasted with interactions
based on ad hoc bargaining or straightforward power politics. Third, multilateralism entails
some reduction in policy autonomy, since the choices and actions of the participating states
are—at least to some degree—constrained by the agreed-upon rules and principles. (534)
HST scholars, reflecting a liberal perspective, propose that hegemonic powers are most
likely to favor institution-building and maintenance while realist scholars argue that institutions
are either manipulated by hegemons or lead to hegemon’s loss of autonomy. In his influential essay
“Power and Weakness”, unilateralist Robert Kagan (2003) posits that a hegemon will seek to maximize its freedom of action by pursing a unilateral diplomacy, while militarily weak countries will
seek refuge in multilateral diplomacy to constrain the power of the strong.
The Debate on Strategies of Regional Hegemon
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the study of regional powers’ strategies,
which they adopt in relationships with their neighboring states within their respective regions;
these studies stimulate the question of whether regional power behavior is similar to that of global
powers. Pedersen (2002) proposes four possible strategies that regional great powers adopt: unilateral hegemony (strong realist elements, low degree of institutionalism); co-operative hegemony
(medium-level of realist elements, high degree of institutionalism); empire (strong realist elements
and high degree of institutionalization) and concert (soft realist strategy). In his study, Pedersen
mainly focuses on co-operative hegemony, which he proposes as the most plausible strategy for
regional powers (682).
A general distinction among hegemonic strategies at the regional level is proposed by
Destradi (2010) who labels these different types of hegemonic strategies as: hard, intermediate and
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soft hegemony (918). Consistent with Ikenberry and Kupchan's (1990b) coercion model of global
hegemonic power and Pedersen’s (2002) unilateral hegemony model, hard hegemony is based on
overt and subtle coercion in which the hegemon mainly seeks to satisfy its own interest while
depicting them as common interests with other states. In this type of hegemony, sanctions, nonmilitary threats and political pressure are used to make secondary states comply. Intermediate hegemony, on the other hand, is more consistent with HST since in this type of strategy, hegemon
provides material benefits and reward to secondary states and uses hard persuasion tools to ensure
compliance by them. Intermediate hegemony is consistent with what Klaus Knorr (1975) calls
reward power in which hegemon ensures compliance of secondary states by rewarding their compliance rather than punishing them for noncompliance. Lastly, soft hegemony is based on cooperation rather than coercion or inducement. In this type of hegemonic strategy, as in the other two
types, hegemon’s aims and own interests are the forefront. Destradi (2010) defines soft hegemonic
strategy, consistent with Ikenberry and Kupchan’s (1990b) normative persuasion model, as “onesided non-coercive influence aimed at modifying and reshaping the norms and values of subordinate states (920); what we have come to know as soft power (Nye 2004), for example, attraction
by values, lifestyles, and culture, fits hegemonic style.
Regional powers frequently have interest in creating and maintaining regional organizations, and as Flemes (2008) puts it “the leader’s regional influence will depend on its ability to
determine the cooperation agenda, which can be achieved either through a cooperative or unilateral
hegemonic strategy of leadership or one of co-operative hegemony” (103). Strategies in promoting
regional institutionalization and comparison between co-operative and unilateral strategies are the
main focus in Pedersen’s study. Pedersen (2002) studied the reasons major regional states pursue
the strategy of cooperation and developed the notion of “co-operative hegemony”. Co-operative

9
hegemony focuses on comparatively weak or declining regional big powers and formative phases
of regional institutionalization. According to the theory, militarily weak major powers will normally adopt co-operative hegemony in order to stop the process of decline and regain their influence in world affairs. In addition to militarily weak major powers, this approach is also viable as
a counter-strategy in a global international system where a dominant state holds sway. With the
co-operative hegemony theory, Pedersen attempts to explain regional institutionalization linked to
a long-term strategy of major regional powers by highlighting the importance of power and security elements rather than economic factors in the formative phase of co-operative arrangements.
Regional hegemons’ capacity of power sharing is one of the necessary preconditions for a great
power to adopt the approach and to be successful with the strategy. Pedersen defines power sharing
as “a [regional] big power’s capacity to share power with its neighbors on a durable basis within
common institutions with significant competences” (Pedersen 2002, 689). In co-operative hegemony, other member states within regional institutions have a voice and also the cooperation includes checks on the hegemonic power; Ethiopia’s role through the 1960s and 80s speaking for
and organizing negotiations in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) seemed to reflect many
of these strategies. A different strategy which is consistent with ‘co-operative hegemony’ (Pedersen 2002) and ‘soft hegemony’ (Destradi 2010) is ‘consensual hegemony’ proposed by Burges
(2008). In his study, Burges draws on Gramsci’s suggestion of ‘predominance by consent’ instead
of domination by coercion or imposition. The concept of consensual hegemony, which is proposed
as a leadership strategy by Burges “privileges the creation of consensus through the constructive
inclusion of potentially competing priorities and the shaping of common positive outcomes” (81).
In his study, Burges references to Brazil’s post-Cold War foreign policy, which, according to him,
pursued consensual hegemony but failed to form a stable consensual hegemony. Both Pedersen
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and Burges define the concept of regional hegemony based on the interaction between material
and ideational power resources.
What is Missing in the Literature?
While the regional power literature has extensive single-case studies on regional conflict
and cooperation, studies analyzing regions comprehensively are limited. Different than existing
studies on cooperation and conflict within regions, my study will both analyze aggregate data
trends and discuss different cases to show not only similarities and differences but also reasons for
contrasts. The framework that will be presented in this dissertation will allow the readers to identify cases in terms of similar and different strategies and behaviors of regional hegemons and regional great powers in cooperative and conflict situations within different regions and power structures.
Moreover, building on Lemke’s study, this dissertation will test HST hypotheses at the
regional level by adding independent variables to Lemke’s statistical test as well as by making
conceptual and theoretical improvements to Lemke’s study. This study is an attempt to fill the gap
that is pointed out by Lemke. According to him, the statistical relationships of HST exist at the
regional level, but do not indicate much about predicted circumstances when these theories break
down or about regional powers’ behavior in crisis or conflict situations. Also little attention has
been paid to the behavior or impacts of various types of regional powers, ranging from those with
capabilities strictly in their vicinity or sub-region, to those with strong interests and influence
across an entire region or indeed beyond one region into another.
In addition to region-level analysis of conflictive and cooperative behaviors, this study is
also an attempt to compare regional power behaviors to global power behaviors since only few
have attempted to make this comparison systematically (Lemke 2002). Lake and Morgan (1997)
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note that region level analysis does not necessarily need unique theories, rather “the task is to
incorporate regional politics into our existing approaches and theories” (7). Departing from there,
this study will also draw conclusions in terms of applicability of a system-level theory to regional
level.
In a nutshell, the purpose of this project is to address the issue that is not addressed in
previous studies by offering a coherent explanation of behaviors and strategies of various types of
regional powers by using post-Cold War cases in military, security, and economic issues and comparing them to global powers. To develop such an explanation, this dissertation will study the
region-level effects of the presence of regional great powers or regional hegemon(s) and attempt
to answer three interrelated questions: first, how can we characterize behaviors of regional powers?
Second, as an attempt to understand conflictive and cooperative, e.g., coalitional, behaviors of
regional powers, is system-level HST applicable to regional-level analysis? And third, what factors
affect behaviors and dominance patterns of regional great powers? There are sub-questions of these
main questions, which will be raised throughout the study, as well.
Theoretical Framework
In this study, I will use a well-established IR theory- HST. In dealing with global/regional
hierarchy consequences for global/regional stability, HST enjoys an accepted place framework.
HST (Kindleberger 1974; Keohane 1980) deals with power hierarchies and shows how distribution
of power affects international outcomes (cooperation and conflict). The main premise of this theory is that the international system needs a hegemonic power, who will set the systemic rules of
the behavior for all other states, to promote peace or stability. As a term, HST was invented by
Robert Keohane (1984) while the original thesis of the theory was put forward by Kindleberger
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(1973). In his study, Kindleberger argues that Great Britain was the global hegemon in the nineteenth century who stabilized the economic regime and set the rules of a liberal economic system,
which all other states followed. According to him, the outcome of 1929 Great Depression was the
instability of the international economic system because Great Britain was too weak to stabilize
the international system, and the U.S was unwilling to do so. Kindleberger claims that “for the
world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer” (305). According to
him (1973), a hegemon can stabilize the system by organizing and carrying out five functions:
“maintaining a relatively open market for distress goods, providing countercyclical, or at least
stable, long term lending, policing a relatively stable system of exchange rates, ensuring the coordination of macroeconomic policies, acting as a lender of last resort by discounting or otherwise
providing liquidity in financial crisis” (Kindleberger 1986, 289). He argues that stability can be
assured only if hegemon bears the cost of providing public goods and extracts the support of others.
Keohane (1980) in developing Kindleberger’s thesis, argues that “hegemonic structures of power,
dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international
regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed” (132). Accordingly, this order is constituted by the creation of international regimes and the provision of collective goods. Gilpin
(1975; 1981) also associates the existence of a hegemon with the stability of the world economy
arguing that a hegemon is necessary to assure an open and stable world economy. In his later study,
Gilpin (2001) focuses on the hegemon’s tasks and role by arguing that “there can be no liberal
international economy unless there is a leader that uses its resources and influence to establish and
manage an international economy based on free trade, monetary stability, and freedom of capital
movement” (97-98).
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Gilpin (1983) also focuses on the implications of hegemonic governance in increasing stable cooperation in the international system. He proposes hegemonic governance as a broader theoretical notion by focusing on its security implications. Gilpin argues that the existence of
hegemon fosters stability and peace. As in his latter study (2001), he focuses on hegemony and
cooperation by highlighting the centrality of hegemony in promoting international cooperation.
Regional predominant powers can follow institutional foreign policy strategies at a regional level
as they can do so at different systemic levels and lead the creation and maintenance of regional
organizations as we witness in cooperative relationship patterns in Southern Africa under the leadership of South Africa and development of institutions such as South African Development Community (SADC).
In this study, I will attempt to combine variables from realist (unilateralism, manipulation,
causes of war) and liberal (multilateralism, institutionalism, conditions for peace) school of
thoughts by focusing on regions as the main level of analysis. Moreover, to compare behaviors of
regional powers to global powers, I will also use global system as a level of analysis in combination
with regional system or subsystem. While imposing system-level theories on regions, openness of
regional settings will be also considered in case studies. As Lake and Morgan (1997) argue when
we apply global-level theories to regional settings, we should consider substantial modifications.
For example, when we consider balance of capabilities in global level, we basically look at resources of superpowers while in regional settings outside support and resources of alliances are
factors that affect regional powers’ capabilities (10).
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Key Concepts
Hegemony
The concept of hegemony has been used to refer to different shades of meaning in several
different disciplines and still there is no general consensus on the definition or usage of the term.
As Prys and Robel (2011) argue, many applications of the concept of hegemony still reflect the
lack of conceptual coherence and comprehensiveness (256). By definition, a hegemon must possess a predominance of power capabilities compared to other actors within the international system
and also be willing to exercise leadership. Some studies highlight the importance predominance of
states’ material capabilities to refer to the distribution of power in international power hierarchies,
while in other literature scholars note that supremacy in material capabilities is not enough, and
hegemony requires predominance in multiple spheres such as ideological/cultural, political/ diplomatic, economic, as well as institutional power to persuade others to accept the rules and norms
of the status quo that is largely designated and operated by the hegemon and its allies (Florig 2010;
Brown 2013).
Gilpin (1981) defines hegemony as “the leadership of one state over other states in the
system” (Gilpin 1981, 116). Nabers (2010) argues that “the connection between leadership and
hegemony is one of co-constitution. Leadership is necessarily based on hegemony, while hegemony can only be sustained through leadership” (931). Oran Young (1991) introduces a typology of
leadership (structural, entrepreneurial, intellectual) in which he explains different capabilities
needed for effective leadership. He defines those leadership strategies as:
structural leader works to structural leader works to translate power in the material sense
into bargaining leverage focused on the issue at hand, the entrepreneurial leader uses negotiating skills to cast issues in ways that facilitate integrative bargaining and to broker
interests so as to build consensus around the choice of a preferred institutional arrangement.
Intellectual leaders provide systems of thought that offer a coherent analytical framework
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within which to think about the formation of regimes to deal with international problems.
(Young 1994, 45)
Layne (2006) adds the focus on ‘will’ to Gilpin’s power and control based definition of
hegemony and argues that “hegemony is about will. A hegemon purposefully exercises its overwhelming power to impose order on the international system” (Layne 2006, 11). In assessing the
distribution of power in the Post-Cold War era, even though the United States has faced a relative
decline in many key aspects of capabilities and getting what it wants after 2008, it still has an
overarching dominance within the international system and still is designated, by will, determination and capability, and default as global hegemon (Ikenberry 2004, 630). And as Layne (2006)
puts it, “precisely because the United states is a hegemon, there is a marked asymmetry of influence in its favor” (Layne 2006, 12); US hegemony might, of course, be increasingly challenged by
the likes of Russia and China both in particular regions and globally in the coming years.
As distinct from global hegemons, although much has been written on regional powers,
still there is no consensus on the definition and characteristics of what might be termed a regional
hegemon or, more broadly, a regional power. Nolte (2010) argues that this is perhaps because the
terms are composed of two concepts “-region and power- that are conceptualized quite differently
in IR theory, with great variation with regard to their meaning” (Nolte 2010, 883). The term ‘regional powers’ usually is used interchangeably with other terms such as regional great power,
major regional powers, and regional leaders with emphasis on the most powerful states within the
given region (Osterud, 1992; Huntington, 1999; Schoemann and Alden, 2003) such as Brazil,
China, India, and South Africa. At this point, it is necessary to make a conceptual classification.
As Nolte (2010) points out, we need to distinguish between various terms, such as regional power,
regional great power, and regional hegemon, with the latter term also denoting not just the country
size and regional reach, but its ability to dominate in the region.
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In one of the first attempts to develop a definition of regional great powers in the IR literature, Osterud (1992) defines regional great power “as a state which is geographically a part of the
delineated region; a state which is able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the
region; a state which is highly influential in regional affairs; a state which, contrary to a ‘middle
power’ might also be a great power on a world scale in addition to its regional standing” (12).
Huntington (1999) calls major regional power that which Osterud labeled regional great power
and argued that major regional powers are prominent in areas of the world even beyond their “own”
region, but cannot project their interests and capabilities as universally as a global hegemon like
the United States. According to his classification, major regional powers are Germany and France
in Europe; Russia in Eurasia; China and potentially Japan in East Asia; India in South Asia; Iran
in Southwest Asia; Brazil in Latin America; and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. Hinnebusch
(2013), on the other hand uses the term ‘regional power’ to define states within a sub-system,
“those that have interests and capabilities sufficient to play a major role in regional governance
and even to aspire to hegemony over a particular geographical region” (Hinnebusch 2013, 75).
According to him, these states should possess a combination of economic and military power resources enough to intimidate rivals and provide incentives to allies. He defines outcome indicators
of regional power status as “regional spheres of influence and a sufficient deterrent capability to
resist a coalition of other regional states or even a global great power over regional issues” (Hinnebusch, 2013, 76). At this point, he distinguishes between regional powers and regional hegemon
and argues that soft power is needed for regional hegemony to create “a common regional identity,
an attractive model of governance, creating or leading regional institutions, or delivering regional
public goods. A main indicator of a regional hegemon is its ability to unite its region behind it in
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the global power struggle” (Hinnebusch 2013, 76). In addition to Hinnebusch, the concept ‘regional hegemony’ has been used by Myers (1991), Mearsheimer (2001) and Elman (2004) in designating the place of states within a sub-system hierarchy. Myers (1991) proposes a general definition of regional hegemony by claiming that regional hegemons are ‘states that possess sufficient
power to dominate subordinate state systems” (Myers 1991, 3). Here, Myers highlights the degree
of dominance and material preponderance in defining regional hegemony. In her study, Prys
(2008) makes distinction between regional hegemony and global hegemony and argues that regional hegemony is, in combination with material preponderance, constituted by three dimensions:
perception, provision, and projection. By doing so, she also differentiates hegemony from other
types of hierarchical relationships: domination and imperialism. The dimension of perception includes both the self-perception of the regional hegemon for the regional role and the perception of
other states in the region that neighboring states accept regional hegemon has a special role. The
second dimension is provision, which simply refers to provision of regional public goods as suggested by Kindleberger (1986). Lastly, the dimension of projection is the relationship between
regional hegemon and secondary states and projection of its values and interests. She defines hegemonic projection as “the specific activities of the hegemon that promote its own vision and values
for the region, such as the establishment of institutions and agenda-setting within those institutions;
mediation in conflicts; and financial assistance and, if relevant, conditions attached to it” (10). She
also takes into account specificity of region-level analysis and adds a conditional variable: the
effect of regional openness on regional dynamics. Prys (2010) claims that “in contrast to the global
hegemon, the United States, regional powers have to operate within an overarching international
system determined by the global distribution of power and by international institutions” (482).
Accordingly, external impacts have the ability to limit behaviors of regional powers or provide
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opportunities for them to pursue external interactions, such as partnerships which can alter regional
dynamics.
In this study, theory of regional hegemony by Prys (2008) will be used since it takes into
account material (hard power capability) and ideational power resources (willingness, leadership
as well as provision of public goods) as well as external influences.
For the purpose of this study, therefore, a state will be called ‘regional hegemon’ when it
is the single great power within its respective region, and as Mearsheimer (2001) argues, “no other
state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it” (40); such a power makes
and enforces rules throughout the system and assumes the role of a leader in the subordinate state
system. Indicators for the claim of regional leadership would be looking at three dimension of
power as proposed by Prys. The term “dual-hegemony” will be used when there are two regional
hegemons within the region and material power of both members of dual hegemony significantly
outweighs those of others within their region. The term regional “great power” will be considered
a state or states whose hard power capability share in the region, in terms of military, economic,
demographic outweighs those of other actors in their region but which is not the dominant or hegemonic state(s) in its region; such states would not have the predominant unrivaled leadership role
within the given region. The term “regional powers” will be used for countries that possess sufficient hard power capabilities to project power and exert influence on a regional scale. States that
dominate a sub-regional area but do not qualify as a region wide hegemon or great power will be
termed “limited regional powers”. This term can also include states with considerable muscle in
one or more areas of hard power, such as great petroleum reserves, but which do not qualify as
regional great powers across the spectrum of power attributes (size, military etc.). All of these
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rankings and ratings will be sustained by operational measures of shares of regional power, to be
described in the next chapter.
Region
Regional politics literature has defined the concept of region by focusing upon geographical proximity (Mansfield and Milner, 1997; Lemke, 2002), pointing to the increasing interdependence and organization at the regional level in broad political and economic terms (Hettne, 2003;
Soderbaum 2003; Solingen, 2008; Nel and Stephen ,2010), and by focusing on security interdependence as the defining attribute of the region (Lake and Morgan ,1997; Buzan and Wæver, 2003;
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, 2012). Thompson (1973) reviews work of twenty-two scholars published in the time period of 1958-1971 and creates a regional subsystem attributes list based on
criteria, which have been used by those scholars to identify a regional subsystem. Based on his
review, Thompson concludes that there are four necessary and sufficient conditions for defining
regions and regional subsystems within them: geographical proximity, patterns of interactions (the
degree of regularity and intensity of interactions), the recognition of the regional subsystem as a
distinctive area or theatre of operation, and membership threshold of at least two and more.
In his study, Lemke employs three separate designations of regions and their state memberships. His first designation lists seven regions defined by the Correlates of War Project: Western
Hemisphere, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Asia (Central, East,
South, and Southeast) and Australia Pacific. His second designation is based on Lemke’s (2002)
own definition based on his previous study in which he develops militarily-defined regions he
refers as “Regions of War and Peace Regions” (RoW&P Regions). He defines regions based on
proximity and the ability to interact. Accordingly, states are members of the same region only if
they can interact militarily and can move their own military troops within reach of each other’s
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capital cities. Lemke’s earlier study (2002) analyzed seventeen such regions while his latter study
(2010) reports twenty regions. Lemke’s third designation list defines regions based on the presence
of regional powers: Brazil’s Region, South Africa’s region, Iran’s Region, China’s Region and
India’s Region.
Thompson’s conditions to identify a regional subsystem are closely related to the concept
of regional security complex proposed by Buzan (1991) and later expanded by Buzan and Wæver
(2003). Buzan and Wæver (2003) define regions in terms of security interdependence in their regional security complex theory (RSC). RSC is defined as “a set of units whose major processes of
securitization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be
reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 491). The main
structural feature of this theory is specifying the interactions of anarchy with geographical aspects.
Accordingly, geographically proximate neighboring states are connected within a distinct regional
dynamic: a continuum of conflict and cooperation. Based on RSC, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier
(2012) attempt to identify regional powers and explore how these regional powers affect security
orders. In order to do so, they develop a framework, which is called Regional Powers and Security
Framework (RPSF). While they define regions and memberships based on RSC, they propose a
new list of regions and memberships (44-45).
In this study, I will define regions based on RPSF by focusing on geographical contiguity
and security interdependence. Basically, a state should be geographically located within a region,
in order to be considered as a member of that given region. Moreover, there should be interconnectedness among the key national security interests of states to be considered as memberships of
the same regions. I will also consider countries that might be interconnected to more than one
region in terms of both geography and security and might be a member of more than one region
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or regional system. These countries will be termed overlapped members. While neither Buzan and
Wæver nor Lemke or COW allow for such overlapping, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) also
consider overlapping memberships.
In their study, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) do not consider Oceania as a distinct
region. On the contrary, they consider some of Oceanian countries such as Australia, New Zealand,
and Papua New Guinea as Southeast Asian countries. In this study, I will consider Oceania as a
distinct region by considering some Oceanian countries as overlapped members of other regions.
Other than that, I will adopt Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012)’s designation of regions and
memberships. As Table 1.1 presents, I will designate thirteen regions: North America, South
America, Europe, Central Eurasia, West Africa, Central Africa, Horn of Africa, Southern Africa,
Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania.
Table 1.1. Memberships in Regions, 2010
Regions

Membership

Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, GuateNorth America

mala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, United States
of America

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, EcSouth America

uador, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
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Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, BosniaHerzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Europe
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco,
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
Portugal, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Ukraine, Yugoslavia

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, KyrCentral Eurasia

gyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaWest Africa
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon,
Central Africa

Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Rwanda,
Sudan, Uganda
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Horn of Africa

Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia

Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Southern Africa
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
Middle East and North Africa

Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara,
Yemen

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,Maldives,
South Asia
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South KoNortheast Asia
rea, Taiwan

Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos,
Southeast Asia

Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
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Australia, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Fiji, New
Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,
Vanuatu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Oceania

Nauru, Northern Marina Islands, Palau, American
Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Wallis and Futuna

Source: Adapted from Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 45.
Layout of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. In the introductory chapter of this study, I
provided an in-depth review of power structure and its effects on cooperation and conflict, as well
as the strategies of global and regional hegemons. I also introduced the theoretical framework of
the study, HST, and defined the key concepts of the study: hegemony and region. The proceeding
chapters unfold as follows.
In Chapter 2, I introduce a set of questions to consider and state propositions drawn from
the theory, which includes ‘how can we characterize behaviors of regional hegemons and regional
great powers?’, ‘to what extent is system-level HST applicable to regional-level analysis to understand conflictive and cooperative, e.g., coalitional, behaviors of regional powers?’, and ‘what are
factors that affect behaviors and dominance patterns of regional hegemons, and regional great
powers?’. In this chapter, I also introduce and detail the methodology model used to answer the
research questions of the study, which is a combination of the aggregate data analysis and the
method of structured and focused case comparison proposed by George and Bennett (2005). I
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suggest a typology of regional powers based on their alliance with the global hegemon (alliance
factor) and their security interdependence in another region (overlapped membership). Based on
my suggested typology, I introduce cases from different regional structures and regional power
hierarchies: Brazil (in South America, an allied and non-overlapped case), South Africa (in Southern Africa, an un-allied and non-overlapped case); and India (in South Asia, an un-allied and overlapped case), Germany (in Europe, an allied and non-overlapped case), and Iran (in the Middle
East and North Africa, an un-allied and overlapped case). I conclude the chapter with the operationalization of variables in the statistical analysis and dataset.
In Chapter 3, I define and determine types of regional powers in regional hierarchies based
on regional powers’ hard power capability- military, economic, and demographic. I also determine
regional structures by categorizing regions as unipolar, bipolar and multipolar. In this chapter, I
provide an overview of regional dynamics of each region for the post-Cold War era by providing
figures for relative national power capabilities and regional shares of hard power sources.
Chapter 4 presents an aggregate data analysis by restating the propositions of the study and
describes the findings for each proposition. In this chapter, I present the results of the testing of
each proposition by taking into account regional size. Chapter 5 presents a brief assessment of
selected case studies. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section covers selected cases
of regional hegemons: Brazil, South Africa, and India while the second section analyzes selected
cases of regional great powers, Germany and Iran. Each section examines the position of the regional hegemon/great power in a given regional hierarchy and its role in regional conflict and
cooperation. At the end of each section, a brief comparison among cases is provided.
In Chapter 6, I briefly summarize the study by reminding the theoretical framework, the
main research question of the study, the design of the study and the methodology model. I also
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discuss the important findings in an aggregate data analysis and cases. The last section of the study
concludes with a discussion of the observed patterns in the motivations, strategies and behaviors
of regional hegemons/great powers. Based on these findings, this study also raises issues for future
study.
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CHAPTER 2-RESEARCH DESIGN
This study seeks to address and answer a specific set of questions:
1. How can we characterize behaviors of regional hegemons and regional great powers?
a. Do they behave similarly to global powers on various dimensions and in comparable
situations?
b. What is unique about motivations, strategies and behaviors of regional powers?
c. Do regional powers vary in these patterns in one region as compared to another region?
2. To what extent is system-level HST applicable to regional-level analysis to understand conflictive and cooperative, e.g., coalitional, behaviors of regional powers?
3. What are factors that affect behaviors and dominance patterns of regional hegemons and regional great powers?
a. Is there any power above these regional actors, such as extra-regional or global powers
or allies, which affect their behavior patterns in predictable ways?
b. Do regional hegemons and great powers with significant interests and involvements in
more than one region (e.g., India or Iran) behave systematically differently than powers confined
largely to one region (e.g., Brazil or Germany)?
c. Do variations of their regional conditions and material capabilities affect their behavior?
d. Does regional system structure affect their behavior? (e.g., regional unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity)
Based on these research questions and HST, I have devised a set of eight working propositions grouped into four sets. In each set, one proposition deals with regional organizations while
another one deals with militarized interstate disputes as is mentioned above in more detail.
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Propositions
As mentioned in the previous chapter under theoretical framework, this study will use HST,
which enjoys an accepted place in IR literature. One subfield of the theory focuses primarily on
international economy (Kindleberger 1973; Deudney and Ikenberry 1999) while the other subfield
focuses on the implications of hegemonic governance in increasing stable cooperation in the international system (Keohane and Nye 1977; Gilpin 1983; 2001). Gilpin (1983) proposes hegemonic
governance as a broader theoretical notion and focuses on security implication of hegemonic governance. He argues that the existence of hegemon fosters stability and peace. As in his latter study,
Gilpin (2001) focuses on hegemony and cooperation by highlighting centrality of hegemony in
promoting international cooperation. Regional predominant powers can follow institutional foreign policy strategies at regional level as they can do so at different systemic levels and lead the
creation and maintenance of regional organizations as we witness cooperative relationship patterns
in Southern Africa by the leadership of South Africa and establishment of institutions such as
South African Development Community (SADC). Following Gilpin’s argument and applying to
regional level, I predict that the regional predominant power plays an important role in encouraging
regional cooperation and will involve in the formation of the regional organizations.2

2

Some regional hegemons were also dominant powers during the Cold War within their
respective region and some regional organizations were formed under those hegemonies and maintained since then. In this study, international organizations which were formed in pre-1990s under
those regional hegemons will be also considered.
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Proposition 1a: Regions with a regional hegemon will have a higher number of regional organizations, proportional to regional size, formed subsequent to the hegemony than regions without a
regional hegemon.3
Proposition 1b: Regions with two or more equal or nearly equal regional great powers will have
higher number of regional organizations, proportional to regional size, than in regions with no
regional hegemon or regional great powers.
In addition to prediction of regional organizations, I also predict that existence of a dominant power, which displays superiority in terms of the set of power capabilities, will decrease the
risk of militarized interstate dispute within the region or sub-region.4
Proposition 2a: Regions with a regional hegemon will have lower number of MIDs, proportional
to regional size, than regions without a regional hegemon.5

3

In his statistical analysis, Lemke controls region size by controlling the number of states
in a region and argues that creation and maintenance of regional institutionalized cooperation is
less likely in big regions. As Olson (1965) argues and Lemke puts it “the more members of the
collective, the stronger the incentive to free ride on collective-good-providing efforts of other
group members. The harder it is to coordinate across larger groups, and thus the greater the cost
of providing the collective good at all” (Lemke 2010, 42).
4

The time span of this study is the post-cold war period, and the main independent variable
of this study which is ‘power status’ does not change much during this whole period. On the other
hand, PTT is a dynamic approach in relation to power in international relations. In this study, I
will consider this aspect of the theory and rather than looking at power transitions, I will look for
gaps among regional hegemon or great powers and the closest competitor in their region and
whether it affects to conflictive behavior.
5

When Lemke tests PTT hypotheses, he controls region size by controlling the number of
states within a region and argues that “regions with more state members are likely to have more
MID initiations, other things being equal, simply because with more states there are more opportunities for conflict” (Lemke 2010, 40).
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Proposition 2b: Regions with two or more equal or nearly equal regional great powers will have
lower number of MIDs, proportional to regional size, than regions with no regional hegemon or
regional great powers.
Lemke (1996) developed a multiple-hierarchy model in which he analyzes regional power
hierarchies. The multiple-hierarchy model is a regional adaptation of power transition theory. Instead of one international hierarchy of powers as described by power transition theory, Lemke
(2002) defines the international system as “a series of parallel power hierarchies, each of [which]
functions similarly to the others and to the overall international power hierarchy” (48). Sub-system
hierarchies have a local dominant power at the top of the pyramid supervising local relations to
preserve the local status quo. The regional subsystems are associated with stability and peace as
long as the regionally dominant power maintains its power preponderance. As in PTT, however,
war will follow when a local dissatisfied challenger reaches power parity with the regional dominant power. According to Lemke, sub-system hierarchies are subordinated to the international system hierarchy. The dominant global power as well as global great powers in the international hierarchy that can reach at least two regions can interfere with relations within sub-hierarchies. The
interference is expected especially when “the dominant power or another great power feels
strongly about the issues at stake in a dispute within local hierarchy” (51). The multiple hierarchy
model hypothesizes that if global great powers do not interfere, the regional hierarchies function
as parallel similar international systems and behave as hypothesized by the model.
As stated earlier, Lemke’s independent variables are demographic share, military share and
economic share. Lemke does not take into consideration the impact of global hegemon or extraregional powers on the cooperative and conflictive behaviors of regional hegemon or regional great

31
powers. The American alliance system, for example, is thought to play an important role in regional order and is not only a mechanism to aggregate power to counter external threat but also
and even more importantly a mechanism to manage relations between allies (Ikenberry 2004, 621).
Basically, however, a regional hegemon can isolate its region and can choose not to ally with the
global hegemon, as Egypt’s President Nasser demonstrated in the 1950s and 60s in regard to the
United States. On the other hand, with the alliance system or other entangling relations, the global
hegemon gains an institutionalized political presence in regions, as the United States has done for
example with Pakistan and Philippines. Assuming that a form of “double hegemony” is possible,
in which regions can be dominated by both local and distant dominant powers, and by taking into
consideration the point made by Ikenberry (2004) I expect to see less MIDs but more regional
cooperation in regions where external alliances exist.
Proposition 3a: When regional hegemon or regional great powers are allied with global hegemon
the number of regional organizations, proportional to regional size, increases as compared to regions with non-aligned regional hegemon or regional great powers.
Proposition 3b: When regional hegemon or regional great powers are allied with global hegemon,
the number of MIDs, proportional to regional size, decreases as compared to regions with nonaligned regional hegemon or regional great powers.
As noted, I wish as well to distinguish various types of regional powers and both their
conflict behavior and impact on regional conflict and cooperation patterns; this entails distinction
between regions with a hegemon or dual-hegemon (in overlapped regions), regions with regional
great powers, regions with sub-regional and limited regional powers, and regional great powers
involved in more than one region. For example, China is an overlapped member of both Northeast
and Southeast Asia since China is geographically and strategically involved in both regions. Russia
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similarly plays a powerful role in Central Eurasia, Europe, as well as Northeast Asia. Iran is involved in multiple contiguous regions (Middle East and Central Eurasia) as is Turkey (Middle East
and Europe). When a regional power’s security is interdependent in more than one region’s dynamics through geographic proximity or contiguity (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 46), conflict and cooperation, which take place in these regions will affect and be affected by the state that
we consider as an overlapped state. When we consider security interdependence between overlapped state and most other states in overlapped region, we expect to see fewer intraregional conflicts and more intraregional organizations in overlapped regions because security, economy and
political developments in these regions will be important as these countries are geographically
located nearby.
Proposition 4a: The number of regional organizations, proportional to regional size, are likely to
be higher in overlapped regions in which multi-regional hegemon or great powers are geographically and strategically connected than in regions not linked by such hegemonic overlap.
Proposition 4b: The number of MIDs, proportional to regional size, are likely to be lower in overlapped regions in which multi-regional hegemon or great powers are geographically and strategically connected than in regions not linked by such hegemonic overlap.
Methodology Model
A central goal of this study is to gain a better overall understanding of regional power
behavior and impact at a time of their growing importance by exploring and deconstructing the
concept of regional powers, with distinctions about different types of regional powers (Table 2.1).
In addition to overall aggregate data analysis of regional conflict and institutionalized (IGO) collaboration, in regions of varied polarity characteristics, supplementary comparative case studies
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will be presented to describe the behavior (such as intervention, coalition, alliances) of multi-regional vs. single regional great powers, and regional powers in the presence of or apart from global
power regional presence and alliance.
To evaluate propositions listed above, I will employ comparative case study analysis and
descriptive statistical profiles analyses of each region to augment the case studies. Time span of
this study, unlike Lemke, is the post-Cold War period. Lemke has region-year as his unit of analysis by looking at the time period from 1960 to 2000. In a cross-sectional analysis for the postCold war years, this study’s unit of analysis is region because the main independent variable, which
is ‘power status’ does not show important variation year to year within region. With the case study
method, I aim to provide answers to my research questions and explain whether regional powers
that are categorized according to my suggested typology act according to the logic of HST and
how regional structures affect behaviors of regional powers in cooperation and conflict.
Table 2.1. Suggested Typology of Regional Powers
Overlapped MemAlliance

Non-overlapped Memberships
berships

Allied with a global
Turkey, Japan

Brazil, Australia

hegemon (USA)

Un-aligned with a
global hegemon
(USA)

Post-revolutionary
Iran, PRC, India,
Russia

South Africa, Indonesia, Egypt
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Case Study Method and Case Selection
In this study, I will use comparative case study analysis by adopting the method of structured and focused case comparison by Alexander L. George (1979a; 1979b), Alexander L. George
and Andrew Bennett (2005). In their book, George and Bennett (2005) focus on the importance of
a case-study method for social research and how case studies are designed and carried out by
researchers. They explain the role of case studies in developing casual explanations in particular
events if examined in detail and in comparison by the researcher. George and Bennett (2005) describe the structured focused case comparison method as follows:
The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward. The
method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and
standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the
findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain
aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and focus apply
equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases. (67)
Based on this definition, this study will follow two characteristics - structured and focusedof the comparison method. Before I discuss how these two characteristics of this method will look
like in this study, it will be helpful to explain four criteria that are used in case selection process
for this study.
In order to further test and refine my propositions, four criteria are used for selecting cases:
variance in terms of interest and involvement in multiple or single regions; alliances with global
hegemon or independent; regional power capabilities including regional great powers; and the regional structure (sub-regions and polarity). First, I plan to choose cases by considering whether
regional power is interested or significantly involved in multiple regions (e.g. Iran in both MENA
and Central Eurasia) or primarily one region (Brazil in South America), recognizing that these
designations can be fluid and in the process of change, as for example when India extends from
Central Eurasia to conceivably more involvement in Southeast Asia. Secondly, I plan to select
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cases that have variance in their relationship with the global hegemon and whether they are allied
or un-aligned with the US. For example, Turkey is allied with the US while India is not. Moreover,
I plan to choose my cases so that they display regional power capabilities in terms of hard power
and full regional dominance. These capabilities depend upon economic, military, demographic
capabilities or any combination of these factors. Regional powers can vary in size and capability,
as from China to say Israel. Finally, I plan to choose my cases by taking into consideration different
types of regional structures and whether the region is unipolar, bipolar, or multi-polar. Regional
powers may behave differently in what might be termed unipolar or multipolar regions, i.e., when
they have no real regional rival, or when regional rivals exist.
In this study, therefore, I chose cases based on what they will illustrate and what is exceptional about countries in their own regions. Moreover, four criteria mentioned above helped to
ensure the inclusion of wide variation in independent variables and involvement of cases from
different subclasses. As a result, I chose cases from regions based on variation on power structure
and typology that I developed, which focuses on whether a case is allied with global hegemon or
not and whether a case has an overlapped membership or not. Since the focus of the study is the
post-Cold War period, I chose cases in regional power hierarchies that covers the period from 1990
to 2013.
I now turn to an explanation of how structured and focused characteristics of the comparison method apply to my study. As George and Bennett (2005) define, structured comparison focuses on general questions that are asked to each case. Based on this definition, I will ask a set of
standardized questions to each case, which are developed to reflect focus of the study. These questions include whether regional hegemon, regional great power(s) or regional power in a given
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region increases or decreases the probability of regional organizations or regional militarized interstate disputes within a given region; whether those regional powers in regional hierarchies are
aligned with the United States and if this alliance affects the probability of regional organizations
and regional militarized interstate disputes; and whether regional powers’ having overlapped membership has an effect on the probability of regional organizations and regional militarized interstate
disputes. George and Bennett (2005) also highlight that the cases that are selected to be studied
must be focused. Accordingly “they [cases] should be undertaken with a specific research objective in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective” (70). Based on this definition,
cases selected for this analysis are focused since its research objective mainly deals with regional
power hierarchies and their effect on conflict and cooperation within regions while its theoretical
focus is HST, which is a well-established system-level theory and has a good explanatory power
to understand power hierarchies and international outcomes.
Table 2.2. Cases Selected for Analysis

Allied with USA

Unipolar

Bipolar

Multipolar

Overlapped memberX

X

X

Brazil

X

Germany

ships

Non-overlapped
memberships
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Un-allied with USA

Overlapped memberIndia

X

Iran

South Africa

X

X

ship

Non-overlapped
memberships

Source: Compiled by the author.
Operationalizing Variables in Statistical Analysis and Dataset
The dependent variables: Dependent variables include the aggregate onset of MID within
each region. I will employ COW dataset, which is a conflict-year data set on armed conflict in
which data are available from 1902-2010. COW defines MID as “united historical cases of conflict
in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly
directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of
another state” (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996). While all interstate wars begin as MIDs, most
MIDs never escalate to interstate wars. My other dependent variable is total amount of interstate
regional cooperation for each region during the post-cold war period. I will employ COW Project’s
International Governmental Organizations dataset (IGO), which has the broadest data on intergovernmental organizations. The COW dataset defines an intergovernmental organization as (1) a
formal entity, which must consist of at least three or more sovereign states; (2) must hold regular
plenary sessions at least once every ten years; (3) and possess permanent secretariat and other
important institutionalizations such as corresponding headquarters (Pevehouse et al. 2004). The
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COW dataset has different units of analysis, which are IGO, the IGO-state, and IGO dyad. For the
purpose of this study, I will measure only interstate regional organizations that are formed in post1990 during the hegemony period under study. I will employ the dataset that has IGO as unit of
analysis. This dataset includes all intergovernmental organizations in each-year.
The Independent Variables: In this study, the primary independent variable is the relative
capability (Capability Ratio) based on material dimensions of power in order to determine regional
power hierarchies.6 The empirical source for material power of countries is National Material Capability Dataset, which is collected by COW. This dataset contains annual values for military,
industrial and demographic indicators of national power resources. In this dataset, military capacity is measured by military expenditure and military personnel while distribution of industrial
power is measured based on iron and steel production and energy consumption. Lastly, demographic capacity of states is measured based on urban population and total population. The hard
power capability share variable utilizes the composite power index (CINC score), which is a statistical measure and average of these six sub-variables, which represent the proportional share of
state’s military, economic and demographic capabilities of a given state relative to other states in
the international system. In this study, capability ratio is the ratio of State A’s CINC score from
the COW dataset to the combined CINC capabilities of all countries within given region, which
will look like State A/A+ State B+ State C+ all other countries’ CINC score within the region.

6Even

though only hard power measures are used in power calculations of regional powers
and determining their place in regional hierarchy, soft power rankings of countries by New Persuaders which is an international ranking of soft power, are also considered. Including soft power
rankings to hard power capabilities does not change the place of top-ranked regional powers in
regional hierarchies. It is also important to note that some countries which are not considered as
regional great powers based on their material capabilities appear to be strong on soft power index
(e.g., Israel and United Arab Emirates).
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CINC data is currently only available up to 2007. In this study, I collected data for all these six
sub indicators and calculated nations’ share of the regional total for the period from 2007-2013.7
In addition to consider CINC score, I will also consider breakdown of military, economic and
demographic share of each country in each year by calculating their ratios to other countries within
the region based on COW data set.
Based on propositions regarding alliance with global hegemon, another independent variable is whether or not regional hegemon or great powers are allied with global hegemon, Allies.
This variable utilizes the Formal Alliance dataset by COW. There are three types of formal alliances reported in the dataset including mutual defense pacts, neutrality agreements, and ententes.
I will consider the presence of any of the three types of alliances as indication that the alliance
between the global hegemon and the regional hegemon or regional great powers exists. In this
respect, I will employ a dichotomous measure of alliance and will code the presence of any type
of three alliances as 1, and 0 otherwise.
Overlapped Membership: I will measure overlapped membership based on contiguity (geographical location) as well as security interdependence as the designation of regions and memberships. Security dynamics of one state could be interrelated to other state(s) in another region.
As a result, a regional hegemon or regional great power can qualify for more than one region. I
will look at military deployments of regional hegemons or regional great powers in order to determine the regions of their overlapped membership. I will access original sources such as Military
Balance Blog (IISS Defense and Military Analysis Programme) in order to gather data for this

7

Datasets which are used to calculate post-2007 period are available only up to 2013 thus
this year sets the upper boundary for the period that I collected CINC data. After collecting the
data, I calculated each state’s regional share of military, economic and demographic power. To get
a regional CINC score of each country, I summed three component shares and divided by three.
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independent variable. I will employ a dichotomous measure of overlapped membership and will
code an overlapped regional hegemon or regional great power as 1 and 0 otherwise.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I mentioned research questions of the study in detail and focused on propositions drawn from a system-level theory to test the applicability of HST at regional level. I also
discussed methodology and the quantitative model. Then I paid specific attention to the methodology of comparative case studies as described by George and Bennett (2005). In order to examine
regional power behaviors within regional their settings, I picked cases from different regional
structures and regional power hierarchies by considering my suggested typology. In this dissertation, case studies of regional hegemony are Brazil (in South America, an allied and non-overlapped
case), South Africa (in Southern Africa, an un-allied and non-overlapped case); and India (in South
Asia, an un-allied and overlapped case). Case studies of regional great powers are Germany (in
Europe, an allied and non-overlapped case), and Iran (in the Middle East and North Africa, an unallied and overlapped case). Since, next chapter determines regional powers in regional hierarchies; it will give a more general scope about case studies.
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CHAPTER 3-REGIONAL POWERS AND REGIONAL STRUCTURES IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA
Determining Regional Powers
In assessing the regional distribution of power and power hierarchies in the post-Cold War
era, there are few regional powers that most scholars agree on having overarching capabilities over
other states within their respective regions: Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa (Nolte
2010; Lemke 2010; Nabers 2010; Jesse et al. 2012). Determining which countries fall into the
category of regional dominant powers is not an easy task since there is no consensus on how to
determine and categorize these powers. In doing so, while some studies focus on solely hard power
measures (Lemke 2010), others use both hard power and soft power measures to determine regional dominance. In order to categorize regional powers, I will use three central components of
hard power-military, economic and demographic- and calculate their relative strength within their
respective regions for the years from 1990 to 2013. Relative military, economic and demographic
capacity are important to identify regional powers within their own region. In this study, based on
COW dataset, when military share of regional powers are calculated, military spending (total military budget) and military personnel numbers (size of state armies) are used. As a result, a country’s
military capacity depends on its relative ability to spend on military services. On the other hand,
today, economic power is a fundamental basis of power, including military might. A country’s
economic growth, in addition to fostering regional economic influence can allow increases in its
military spending which in turn will affect military capacity. In other words, country’s military
capacity depends on its economic resources and wealth. Demographic sources of power, such urban and total population are also important components of material and military strength since
they too affect the size of the army.
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In addition to hard power capabilities, I will use three dimensions of power by Prys (2008):
perception (political willingness and followership), projection (projection of own values and preferences), and provision (provision of public goods) in order to determine hegemony in given regions. In this study, as mentioned in Chapter 1, regional hegemon, regional great power (s), regional power, and limited regional power will be used to define power hierarchies within subsystems, see Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Types of Regional Powers in Regional Hierarchies
Type of Power

Criteria

Characteristics

Material

Examples

China in Northeast

preponderance,

Asia, India in South
Dominant influence

Stabilizing and leading

Asia, South Africa in
and control over the

Regional Hegemon
role

Southern Africa, and
region

Acceptance of leader-

Brazil in South Ame-

ship

rica.

Relevant influence
Iran and Turkey in
over the region but

Regional Great
Powers/Secondary
Powers

Strong relative hard
power capability

MENA, Germany,
does not have predomFrance and United
inant leadership role in
Kingdom in Europe.
the region
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Weak for independent
regional politics, proSpain in Europe, Canjects power and exerts
ada and Mexico in
Regional Powers

Hard Power Capability

influence within the
North America, Israel
region, relevant partin MENA.
ners of regional great
powers and hegemon

Dominant influence
Material

and control over a sub-

preponderance in one

regional area

or more types of hard

or

Saudi Arabia in

power

states with considera-

MENA, Venezuela in

or

ble muscle in one or

South America.

dominates a sub-re-

more areas of hard

gional area

power, such as great

Limited Regional
Powers

petroleum reserves.

Source: Compiled by the author.
Regional Structures
Regional power hierarchies reflect the polarity (structure) of any given regional area. Polarity in international relations refers to the distribution of power among the great powers at a given
point in time (Waltz 1979, 97). In this study, the notion of and expectations about polarity taken
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from the global level will be translated to the regional level. The period from 1750s until 1945 has
been designated as multipolar in structure, which is defined as the presence of at least three actors
with nearly equal military, economic, and cultural power to dominate the international system
(Vasquez and Heneham, 1999). Though the phenomenon is subject to scholarly debate (Singer and
Deutsch, 1964; Waltz 1979) history has shown that periods of multipolar distribution of power
have larger and more severe wars (Vasquez and Henehan 1999, 179). Multipolar structure is an
unstable system since in the first half of the 20th century the system resulted in two world wars.
After the World War II until 1989 (the Cold War period), the international system was structured
and functioned as bipolar, though some measures, such as economic power (GDP), it was basically
unipolar with American dominance. In a bipolar system structure, two opposite great powers have
the majority of economic, military and cultural influence to dominate the international system.
During the Cold War period, the United States and the USSR, which had nearly equal amounts of
military power in spheres of political and military influence essentially controlled the international
system. According to Waltz (1964), a bipolar world system limits the violence in the relation of
states and reduces the international violence (882). However, institutional cooperation is not as
likely as in unipolar systems (Wohlforth 1999, 38).
With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR, the US emerged, at least initially,
as the only global hegemon, and a new historical period in the international relations system may
have begun. The unipolar system, which Organski identifies as the most stable, is defined as the
presence of one superpower. Wohlforth (1999) argues that the resultant unipolar system would be
prone to peace because the power of the US overweighs power of other great powers within international system which in turn minimizes security competition among other great powers (7). How-
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ever, other powers, including Russia and China appear to be stirring and asserting their prerogatives at least in regions near their borders (Eastern Europe, Middle East, South and East China
Seas, etc.).
I present a list of global great powers in three periods with different structures of the international system and consequences thought by scholars to come from it in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. International Structure
Polarity

Pole(s)

Periods

Outcome

Prussia, Ottoman Empire, England, Spain,

Unstable and
1816-1945

Multipolar
France, Germany, Ja-

Conflictual

pan, Russia

Bipolar

USSR and USA

1946-1989

Unipolar

USA

1990-2016

Stable and Conflictual

Stable and Prone to
War, Asymmetric

Source: Compiled by the author.
An Overview of Regional Dynamics in Post-Cold War Era
Since the focus of the study is regional powers, looking at each region to determine which
country/countries can be classified as regional hegemon, regional great power, regional power and
limited regional power based on three sources of power mentioned above can be a good starting

46
point.8 But before doing so, two points needed to be made clear: first, since this study deals with
regional powers, in each regional graph, I will include countries those have relative power capabilities equal to or bigger than .10 by 2013 in order to show power gap among them. However,
there might be some exceptions. Relative power of some countries might be under .10 but still may
appear on the graphs if these countries play important role in regional dynamics, i.e. Canada in
North America, and Israel in MENA. Second, while this study allows for overlapped memberships
in which one regional power can be a member of more than one region, this section does not
consider overlapped memberships while determining relative national material capabilities. In this
section, one country is considered a member of only one region, and graphs will not include overlapped memberships.
North America: Based on our categorization of regional powers and hard power measures,
the United States is clearly the regional hegemon of North America. Figure 3.1 shows that the
United States regional share of hard power is steady and high until 2007. With the Great Recession
in 2007, U.S regional relative share declined but still there is a considerable power gap between
the U.S and other countries in the period from 2007-2013. U.S has massive regional share of military, economic and demographic power as shown in 3.2.9 In 2013, U.S had 82 percent military
capability, 78 percent economic capability and 59 percent of demographic capability of the region.
There is a huge power gap between the United States and the rest of the states within the region.

8

While focusing on regional dynamics in different regions, I will focus on regions which
have unipolar, bipolar or multipolar regional structures. Since focus of the study is regional powers, I will not focus on regions which are classified as nonpolar. Nonpolar region is defined by
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) as “there is no state within the region that demonstrates a
higher level of capacity across a number of indicators” (56).
9

In order to identify Post-Cold War regional powers, I picked three different years to see
how their power differ using this period. 2013 is the upper threshold since the data is available
until 2013.
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Canada’s relative power was .07 in 2013, I still include Canada in relative capability charts of
North America because Canada plays an important role in regional dynamics. In this region, Canada and Mexico can be regarded as regional powers. Especially, Mexico is a rising regional power
compared to Canada based on three dimensions of power from 1997 to 2013. In terms of power
structure, North America can be regarded as a unipolar region with the material preponderance
and domination of the United States.
Figure 3.1. Relative National Power Capabilities in North America
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Figure 3.2. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in North America
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South America: Brazil’s regional hegemony based on its relative material capability compared to its most powerful neighbors such as Columbia, Argentina and Venezuela is very clear in
Figure 3.3. While there was a slight decline in Brazil’s share of military power and a slight increase
in Columbia’s share of military power from 1997 to 2013, Brazil is still region’s dominant military
power. In terms of economic capability, Brazil has an economic growth while other regional powers remain the same or decrease as represented in Figure 3.4. As North America, South America
can also be regarded as unipolar with the material preponderance of Brazil, which is called as
regional hegemon in this study. As mentioned in previous paragraph, countries those qualify .10
and up in their relative capability are included in graphs. Venezuela is another exception to this
rule because based on limited regional power definition, Venezuela qualifies with its dominance
of oil reserves as limited regional power. Today, Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil
reserves.
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Figure 3.3. Relative National Power Capabilities in South America
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Europe: Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy can be defined as regional great powers by having roughly equal shares of material capability. Europe does not have a regional
hegemon since none of these regional powers have the ability to dominate or influence the region
alone. Figure 3.5 shows relative power position of the four states within their region. In 2013, all
four states had relatively the same standings in their region. Germany had .15 percent of relative
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power capability. The closest power to Germany in Europe is France by having .13 percent of
relative power capability. Both United Kingdom and Italy had .11 percent of relative power capability of the region in 2013. As Figure 3.6 depicts, by 2013, France has the strongest share of
military power in the region with a slight decrease from 1997 to 2013. Germany, on the other hand
is the strongest regional power in economic and demographic dimensions. Germany’s economic
growth and decline is irregular during the period of 1997-2003. The type of regional polarity of
Europe during the Post-Cold War era can be defined as multipolar.10

10

Contemporary Russia, like the Soviet Union, is both geographically, politically, and economically involved in Europe. Although territorially Russia is more Asian than European, Russia
has a unique position as a transcontinental country which significantly influences Russian foreign
policy. As Ali (2012) puts it “geography, history, politics and economics render Russia both Asian
and European; neither continent can escape this mega-state’s existential influence” (100). Russia
strategically focuses on its immediate neighborhood to restore its influence over time and to do so
specifically meddles in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe. Recently, Russia tried to achieve
some degree of control by invading eastern Ukraine by claiming that Russian government has the
responsibility to defend the rights of Russian minorities abroad. Russia also asserts influence economically by relying on energy politics since Central and Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria, and Ukraine heavily depend on Russian natural gas (Grygiel 2009). Russia has a
significant regional influence, specifically in Eastern Europe; however, the role that Russia has
chosen was more of a competitive one which led to greater tension as in examples of Ukraine and
Crimea.

51
Figure 3.5. Relative National Power Capabilities in Europe
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Central Eurasia: In this study, Russia is considered as a Central Eurasian country, and
based on that configuration, Russia occupies an unchallenged position of power in the region by
having .80 percent of relative power capability. In Figure 3.7, I include Kazakhstan, which has
only .05 percent relative power capability of the region to show the power disparity between Russia
and the state that is closest to it in relative capability standing. Today, Russia dominates Central
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Eurasia by having 83 percent share of military power, 86 percent share of economic power, and
69 percent share of demographic power as shown in Figure 3.8. This region has high structural
inequality, which creates an atmosphere for Russia to exercise its regional hegemony in Central
Eurasia. This subsystem can be defined as unipolar in post-Cold War era.
Figure 3.7. Relative National Power Capabilities in Central Eurasia
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West Africa: As Figure 3.9 shows, Nigeria’s national power growth since the end of the
Cold War and the power discrepancy between Nigeria vis-a-vis other countries in the region show
that Nigeria has an unchallenged regional standing. As in the case with Central Eurasia, I include
Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon (both have .07 percent of relative power capability in 2013) in relative
power capability graph of West Africa to show power gap in the region. Nigeria is the strongest
country with the highest share of military, economic and demographic power in West Africa.
While Nigeria’s military share of power had a sharp decrease from 1997 to 2007, it experienced a
slight increase from 2007 to 2013. On the other hand, with a slow increase, economic growth of
Nigeria reached a peak of 80 percent relative to its region as shown in 3.10. Even though Nigeria
confronts internal and external challenges, still it has the ability to exercise considerable influence
over its neighbors and provide public goods, such as maintenance of peace and order in the region.
West Africa can be regarded as a unipolar region with regional hegemony of Nigeria.
Figure 3.9. Relative National Power Capabilities in West Africa
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Figure 3.10. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in West Africa
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Southern Africa: As Figure 3.11 depicts, South Africa has been experiencing unstable
growth and decline in its relative share of regional power since the end of the Cold War. In the
early 1990s, there was a large power gap between the strongest and the rest of the states while this
gap steadily narrowed in the period from 1990 to 2007, but since 2007, while South Africa has
been experiencing a steady relative power growth, Democratic Republic of Congo, which is the
closest power to South Africa has been experiencing a steady relative power decline. Data in Figure 3.12 reveal growth and decline in different hard power resources of the two countries. Today,
South Africa’s economic dominance over its neighbors is evident by having 77 percent of relative
economic power. However, there is a slow and then a sharp decline in its relative military capability in the period of 1997-2013. By 2013, South Africa has only 23 percent of relative military
power while Democratic Republic of Congo has 15 percent of relative military power. In terms of
demographic capability, South Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo have somewhat similar
demographic share. At this point, it is important to note that as mentioned earlier, relative power
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calculations are based on hard power measures, which include only raw statistics. However, considering raw statistics alone and determining regional power hierarchies based on only hard power
measures may lead to flaws. Southern Africa needs to be examined carefully because even though
Democratic Republic of Congo is the closest power to South Africa’s relative power capability
statistically, internal challenges such as civil war that DRC faces prevents DRC to be a rival of
South Africa. Regional power structure of South African region can be defined as unipolar with
the dominance of South Africa.
Figure 3.11. Relative National Power Capabilities in Southern Africa
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Figure 3.12. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Southern Africa
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Middle East and North Africa: As Europe, the MENA region can also be regarded as a
multipolar region as depicted in 3.13. Based on their relative power position within the subsystem,
four MENA powers can be regarded as regional powers each by having relative power capability
bigger than 10 percent: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As in some other regions mentioned
above, Israel is also an exception to be included in regional graphs. Even though Israel’s relative
capability is not equal to or bigger than 10 percent in any four periods used in the graphs, and its
relative power is only 04 percent in 2013, Israel is still included in graphs since it is a very important power in regional politics. MENA region is a multipolar region; however, in contrast to
Europe, MENA region has an unbalanced distribution of material power sources. Even though
Saudi Arabia has a slight increase then a sharp decrease in its military share in the period of 19972013, still has the largest share of military power. Saudi Arabia has 22 percent of relative military
power while Turkey, Iran and Egypt each have roughly 12 percent of relative military power of
the region. In terms of economic capability, Turkey has an increasing economic growth and has
32 percent of relative economic power in the region and does not have a significant gap relative to
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other regional powers in the region. Demographic share of regional powers in MENA region shows
that all regional powers except Saudi Arabia have similar relative demographic share roughly 18
percent while Saudi Arabia has only 08 percent if relative demographic share as shown in Figure
3.14.
Figure 3.13. Relative National Power Capabilities in MENA
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South Asia: When one compares relative share of countries within the region, one sees that
there is a significant power gap between India vis-a-vis other countries in the region. Figure 3.15
includes only two countries since only India by having 79 percent of relative power capability and
Pakistan by having 11 percent of relative power capability qualify to appear on regional distribution of power chart. As Figure 3.16 shows, India is the dominant power in South Asia in all three
sources of power and has 70 percent and above of relative share in all three dimensions in comparison to Pakistan, which can be considered as a regional power. India as both regional and global
power receives increasing attention in academic circle. India’s leadership within the region, its
active role in regional organizations and relationship with its neighbors qualifies India as a regional
hegemon. Pakistan as a regional power is also important in South Asian regional dynamics since
its relationship with its long standing rival India shapes the future of region’s security.
Figure 3.15. Relative National Power Capabilities in South Asia
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Figure 3.16. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in South Asia
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Northeast Asia: Northeast Asia is an important region for this study since it has experienced both bipolar and unipolar regional structures during the post-Cold War period. China and
Japan have important roles in region’s dynamics since the end of the Cold War. Relative power
gap between China and Japan was small in the early post-Cold War years, and regional power
structure of this period can be regarded as bipolar since China and Japan were two regional great
powers vis-a-vis other states in the region until 2001. Figure 3.17 depicts relative capability of
China and Japan since 1990 and China’s rise to regional hegemony in the post-Cold War period.
Especially since 2001, power gap between China and Japan has been increasing steadily.11 As
Figure 3.18 shows, today, China is incomparably stronger than it was in the late 20th century, and
it is the regional hegemon of Northeast Asia by having 61 percent of military share, 79 percent of

11

A regional structure turns from bipolar to unipolar when to conditions are met within the
given region: three power dimensions (military economic, and demographic) of the primary regional power is higher than the secondary regional power; and the primary power’s CINC is at
least two times of the secondary power.
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economic share, and 84 percent of demographic share. Current Northeast Asian power structure
can be regarded as unipolar.12
Figure 3.17. Relative National Power Capabilities in Northeast Asia
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As a Central Eurasian country, Russia is not only engaged in Europe but also Northeast
Asia’s security environment is an important focus for Russian foreign policy. Geographic location,
security and economy are factors that make Russia an overlapped member of Europe and Northeast
Asia. While Russia’s engagement in Europe’s security dynamics has a historical background, Russia’s focus on Northeast Asia has been inconsistent and only recently, after a decline in its security
influence in the region, Russia’s interest as well as strategic re-engagement in the region began to
increase significantly. The re-engagement attempt is explained by Cosh (2014) as “Moscow seems
to have assessed that the region’s [Northeast Asia] rich natural resources offer viable opportunities
for sustained economic development, particularly in the context that the continuing rise of China
and its steadily-increasing military capabilities warrant a greater focus by Russia on the Far East”
(4). In order to improve its standing and regional influence, Russia has been paying attention to
security cooperation with key regional actors. Especially China is significantly important for Russia in terms of security since Russia shares a land border with China, and a peaceful relationship
between Russia and China ensures border security (Buszynski 2002). Economic engagement with
the region such as increasing regional trade is also important for Russia in order to assert its influence over the region. Russia has attempted to develop its relationship with other Northeast Asian
countries including Japan and the Koreas.
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Figure 3.18. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Northeast Asia
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Southeast Asia: As figure 3.19 indicates Indonesia has 33 percent of relative power. Vietnam follows Indonesia by having 20 percent of relative power, and Philippines is the third country that appears on the chart since it has 10 percent of relative power capability in the region. Figure
3.20 depicts that the power trajectory of the region shows that Indonesia has had remarkably steady
economic growth since the late 1990s. Even though there are ups and downs in military and demographic power of Indonesia, still Indonesia holds the greatest share of hard power capabilities
in the region since the end of the Cold War. Vietnam, which has the closest share of military and
economic power in the region, is a rising power in comparison to its share of power in 2007. Based
on definition of power hierarchy, Indonesia can be regarded as a regional great power while Vietnam resembles almost a regional power.13

13

Two regional hegemons compete for economic and strategic benefits in the Southeast
Asia and are considered as overlapped members of the region: China and India.
For China, Southeast Asia is important for its security environment since China has both
land and sea connections with the region. With the end of the Cold War, Chinese-Southeast Asian
ties developed and improved greatly especially through bilateral and multilateral institutionalized
regional mechanisms, namely Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With the end of
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Figure 3.19. Relative National Power Capabilities in Southeast Asia
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the Cold War, China started to engage in security dialogues, and was invited to join ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which was formed in 1994 to deal with Southeast Asian security issues. China
became a consultative partner of the ARF. The increase in dialogue and cooperation made China
an important power for ASEAN’s economic and political development and weakened Western
influence on region’s affairs (To 2001). Through series of policy initiatives, active participation in
regional dialogues, improved economic and trade relations, China has been trying to refurbish its
image among ASEAN countries and to convince them of its peaceful and benign intentions in its
political, economic, and security relations with the region,
A peaceful regional order in Southeast Asia is also important for India since India also has
both land and sea borders with Southeast Asia and also engaged in Southeast Asia with its Look
East Policy which focused on economic engagement with ASEAN countries in the 1990s. With
the changing distribution of power after the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union
which was India’s main trading partner, India re-engaged with the region to strengthen its economic ties with Southeast Asian countries. In terms of defense and security, India is involved in
regional dialogue mechanisms and attempts to exercise its political influence through these mechanisms (Blank, Moroney, Rabasa and Lin 2015). As China, India also works to maintain regional
order and stability.
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Figure 3.20. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Southeast Asia
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Oceania: As in North America and Central Eurasia, the power discrepancy in Oceania also
makes the region unipolar. Figure 3.21 which shows the power gap between Australia and New
Zealand clearly depicts the regional hegemony of Australia. Australia does not have any substantial threat to its power status in the region since the closest power to Australia is New Zealand.
Figure 3.22 shows represents that Australia has 86 percent of military share, 84 percent of economic share and 71 percent of demographic share in 2013 while New Zealand’s share of power in
all three dimensions are below 15 percent in 2013.
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Figure 3.21. Relative National Power Capabilities in Oceania
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Figure 3.22. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Oceania
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Conclusion
In this Chapter, I determined regional power hierarchies in each region based on three hard
power resources- military, economic, and demographic. In addition to material capabilities, ideational power resources (willingness, leadership as well as provision of public goods) help to distinguish between regional hegemons and materially preponderant powers. Based on this study’s
conceptualization of regional hegemonic power, all eight unipolar regions (North America, South
America, Central Eurasia, West Africa, Southern Africa, South Asia, Northeast Asia and Oceania)
have a regional hegemon, which has the ability and will to dominate its region. Three regions
(Europe, MENA, and Southeast Asia), which have more than two regional great powers are categorized as multipolar regions. Two regions (Central Africa and Horn of Africa), which have no
regional hegemon or great powers are categorized as nonpolar regions. In addition to these groupings, there is only one region designated as bipolar from 1990 to 2004: Northeast Asia. After 2004,
Northeast Asia became unipolar with the dominance of China. It is also important to note that since
the aim of this section is to determine regional power hierarchies, this section considered each
regional power as a member of only one region based on the designation of regions and memberships by Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012). The case study section will consider overlapped
memberships and alliances and how they affect behaviors of regional power in cooperation and
conflict in regional settings.

66
CHAPTER 4-RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This study is a region-level analysis and focuses on how regional hegemons or regional
great powers affect conflict and cooperation in their regional settings. As it is represented in Chapter 3 in detail, thirteen regions are analyzed based on this study’s conceptualization of region. Eight
of these regions are unipolar regions; based on conceptualization of regional hegemons, all unipolar regions have a regional hegemon: North America, South America, Central Eurasia, West Africa, Southern Africa, South Asia, Northeast Asia and Oceania while three regions are classified
as multipolar with at least three regional great powers: Europe, Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), and Southeast Asia. In addition to these regions, there are two nonpolar regions in which
“there is not a clear enough concentration of power to classify any state as a regional pole (StewartIngersoll and Frazier 2012, 59): Central Africa and Horn of Africa, which will only be mentioned
in this chapter since the focus of this study is the effect of regional hegemonic and great powers.
However, I will refer to these regional groupings while I am presenting the findings and evaluating
propositions.
This study takes into account the effect of regional size (number of countries) on number
of intraregional organizations and militarized interstates disputes since regions with a proportionally larger number of countries (i.e. Europe with forty three countries and MENA with twenty one
countries) may have more IGOs and/or MIDs than others regardless of the effect of hegemonic
structure. Thus, two results are presented for each proposition for each region: total number of
IGOs and MIDs, and IGOs per country and MIDs per country.
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, propositions are mainly built on HST which deals with
the relationship between distribution of power and international outcomes (cooperation and conflict). This study is an attempt to show whether system-level HST is applicable to regional-level
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analysis in understanding and accounting for cooperative and conflictive behaviors in the aggregate and also specifically of regional powers themselves. The first set of region-level propositions
(1a and1b) and the second set of propositions (2a and 2b) are similar to what HST proposes for the
relationship between the existence of global hegemons and prevalence of international cooperation
and conflict. Proposition 1a states that regions with a regional hegemon are more likely to have
higher number of regional organizations than regions without a regional hegemon taking into account regional size. This proposition compares unipolar hegemonic regions to all other type of
regions (multipolar regions and nonpolar regions). Related to this proposition, proposition 1b proposes that regions with two or more regional great powers are more likely to have more regional
organizations than regions with no regional great powers or regional hegemons.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, I employed the COW Project’s International Governmental
Organizations dataset for the period from 1990 to 2005. As Lemke (2010) also did, I constructed
a region-year dataset for regional intergovernmental organizations based on regions and their
memberships that I have assigned in Chapter 1. All global international organizations are eliminated and only intraregional organizations are considered.
Figure 4.1 represents total number of IGOs while Figure 4.2 shows the result of propositions based on the data gathered from the COW dataset on IGOs by controlling for regional size.
Figure 4.2 shows that, as proposed, the eight unipolar regions with a regional hegemon (North
America, South America, Central Eurasia, West Africa, South Africa, South Asia, Northeast Asia
and Oceania) have more intraregional organizations than the three multipolar regions (Europe,
MENA and Southeast Asia) and nonpolar regions since the end of the Cold War. Indeed the nonpolar regions (Central Africa and Horn of Africa) did not have any intraregional organizations
during post-Cold War period. It can, therefore, be concluded that region-level propositions of 1a
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and 1b are supported by the results. It is important to note that there is not much difference between
unipolar and multipolar regions in terms of the number of IGOs. One of the factors that affected
the result and led to a high number of intraregional organizations in multipolar regions could be
Europe. Europe is a unique and advanced model for regional integration and cooperation, and is a
multipolar region with forty-three countries, which has developed twenty-three regional organizations in total during the Post-Cold War Era. Europe’s uniqueness will be explained in detail in the
case study section. Still it is noteworthy that despite the density of IGOs in multipolar Europe,
unipolar hegemonic regions still have higher total and proportional number of IGOs.
Figure 4.1. Total Intraregional Organizations by Region Structure
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Figure 4.2. Intraregional Organizations per Country by Region Structure
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The second set of region-level propositions deals with the distribution of power and prevalence of intraregional conflicts. Proposition 2a states that regions with a regional hegemon will
have fewer intraregional MIDs than regions without a regional hegemon and compares regions
with a regional hegemon to all others. Proposition 2b proposes that regions with two or more regional great powers will have fewer intraregional conflicts than regions without a regional
hegemon or regional great power. To test these propositions, I employed the COW dataset for the
period from 1990 to 2010 and constructed a region-year dataset for this dependent variable since
the MID dataset is also not in the form of aggregate regional data.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicate the relationship between regional distribution of power and
intraregional MIDs. For this analysis, I identify eight unipolar regions with a regional hegemon.
Based on Figure 4.4, there is essentially no difference between unipolar and multipolar regions’
proportional number of intraregional MIDs; if anything, contrary to the hypothesis, multipolar
regions are slightly less conflictual than unipolar ones. It is true, though that regions with greater
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power concentration tend to be less conflictual, at least as measured by militarized disputes. As
proposed in Proposition 2b, I expected to see fewer intraregional MIDs in multipolar regions (Europe, MENA and Southeast Asia) than in nonpolar regions (Central Africa and Horn of Africa).
As expected, nonpolar regions have the proportionally highest number of MIDs during the postCold War Period, controlling regional size. Hence the proposition positing a marked stabilizing
effect of hegemony on regional conflict appear to be borne out at least when controlling for regional size.
Propositions, which test the applicability of HST to region-level show how the relationship
between the distribution of power and the existence of preponderant power within the region affects the amount of regional cooperation and conflict during the Post-Cold War period. Region
level adaptation of HST propositions about cooperation are supported by the results.
Figure 4.3. Total Intraregional MIDs by Region Structure
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Figure 4.4. Total Intraregional MIDs per Country by Region Structure
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The third set of region-level propositions are related to the research question, “Is there any
power above these regional actors, such as extra-regional or global powers or allies that affects
their behavior patterns in predictable ways?” Here, I consider the impact of global hegemons on
cooperative and conflictive behaviors of regional hegemons or regional great powers. For the purpose of this question, I classify regions with regional hegemons as ‘allied with USA’ or not. Classifying regions with more than one regional great power as ‘allied with USA or not’ can be problematic because these regions have more than one regional great power and while one of them
might be allied with the US others may not (i.e. Turkey is allied with the US while present day
Iran is not). In order to overcome this problem, I will consider a multipolar region ‘allied with the
US’ if any great power in a region is allied.
Proposition 3a predicts that regions where external alliances with hegemons exist (South
America, Europe, MENA, Southeast Asia and Oceania) have more intraregional organizations as
compared to regions with non-aligned regional hegemon (Central Eurasia, West Africa, Southern
Africa, South Asia, and Northeast Asia) or regional great powers (none). Proposition 3b states that
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regions with an aligned regional hegemon or regional great power have less intraregional conflicts
than regions where such alliances do not exist. The Formal Alliance dataset by COW was employed to test these propositions.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show divergent results for the relationship between alliance with the
US and number of intraregional organizations. Figure 4.5 does not consider regional size and supports proposition 3a while Figure 4.6 controls for regional size and as opposed to what is proposed,
regions, which are un-allied with the US have a proportionally higher number of regional organizations than others. As opposed to what is proposed in 3a, regions un-allied with the US (Central
Eurasia, Southern Africa, South Asia, and Northeast Asia) had more intraregional organizations
than regions with regional hegemons or regional great powers allied with the US (South America,
Oceania with a regional hegemon allied with USA; and Europe, MENA and Southeast Asia with
at least one regional great power allied with USA). Based on the result we can conclude that,
alliance ties with the US do not have a positive effect on the number of intraregional organizations
in unipolar hegemonic regions and multipolar regions.
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Figure 4.5. Total Intraregional Organizations by Alliance
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Figure 4.6. Intraregional Organizations per Country by Alliance
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Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show results for the relationship between alliance with a global
hegemon and mean number of intraregional MIDs. Here, there are also differences between two
figures since for Figure 4.7, which essentially shows no difference in conflict levels, does not
consider regional size while Figure 4.8 does. Since results are interpreted based on controlling
regional size, as expected, regions with a regional hegemon allied with the US and regions with at
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least one regional great power allied with USA had proportionally fewer intraregional MIDs than
regions with regional hegemon and regional great powers un-allied with the US, which supports
proposition 3b, see Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.7. Total Intraregional MIDs by Alliance
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Figure 4.8. Intraregional MIDs per Country by Alliance
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To sort out specific effects of US alliance on regional polarity, in contrast to what has been
done for the third set of propositions related to alliance and the existence of intraregional cooperation, here I distinguish between region type (allied and un-allied) based on regional polarity. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 present results for regional alliances by polarity and show how these regional
factors interact to shape interregional cooperation and conflict among countries. Figure 4.9 shows
that allied unipolar hegemonic regions have lower number of IGOs than un-allied unipolar hegemonic regions and allied multipolar regions. There is also no essential difference between un-allied
unipolar hegemonic regions’ and allied multipolar regions’ proportional number of intraregional
IGOs while allied multipolar regions are slightly more cooperative than un-allied unipolar regions.
As a result, US alliance does not really increase cooperative interactions among countries in a
given region rather region polarity plays more important role in cooperative behaviors of regional
powers.
Figure 4.9. Intraregional Organizations per Country by Polarity and Alliance
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Figure 4.10 presents results for the relationship between regional alliances by polarity and
intraregional MIDs. Based on the results, allied unipolar hegemonic regions have proportionally
lower number of intraregional MIDs than allied multipolar regions and un-allied unipolar regions.
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Here, it is important to distinguish between allied unipolar hegemonic regions from un-allied unipolar hegemonic regions. Even though the region structure is unipolar, alliance ties affect the number of intraregional conflicts within a given region. As a result, while alliance with the US makes
a difference in overall patterns of conflict, it does not really make a difference in cooperative behaviors of regional powers.
Figure 4.10. Intraregional MIDs per Country by Polarity and Alliance
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The fourth set propositions are drawn from the question, “Do regional hegemons and great
powers with significant interests and involvements in more than one region (i.e. India, China or
Russia) have different regional impacts on intraregional outcomes (cooperation and conflict) than
powers confined to a region (e.g., Brazil and South Africa)?” For this research question, I look at
whether amount of cooperation or conflict is high or low in overlapped regions, i.e., where regional
hegemons or regional great powers have overlapped memberships. Proposition 4a states that regions in which regional hegemons or regional great powers have overlapped memberships (South
America, Europe, Central Eurasia, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia) have more intraregional
organizations than in regions not linked by such overlap. Proposition 4b states that the number of
MIDs is expected to be lower in overlapped regions than in regions not linked by such overlap.
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Figure 4.11 and 4.12 present the relationship between overlapped regions and the number
of intraregional organizations. As expected, overlapped regions had proportionally more intraregional organizations than non-overlapped regions during the post-Cold War period, and results
based on the dataset support proposition 4a, see Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.11. Total Intraregional Organizations by Overlapped Membership
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Figure 4.12. Intraregional Organizations per Country by Overlapped Membership
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Figure 4.13 and 4.14 show the relationship between overlapped regions and intraregional
MIDs. As expected, overlapped regions (South America, Europe, Central Eurasia, Northeast Asia,
and Southeast Asia) had fewer intraregional MIDs than non-overlapped regions (all others), which
supports proposition 4b. Based on these results, it can be concluded that overlapped memberships
of regional hegemon and/or regional great powers reduce conflictive behaviors within overlapped
regions.
Figure 4.13. Total Intraregional MIDs by Overlapped Membership
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Figure 4.14. Intraregional MIDs per Country by Overlapped Membership
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As alliance variable, I also analyze overlapped membership by region structure to show
whether overlapped membership makes a difference in overall patterns of regional cooperation
and conflict. In order to sort out any specific effect of overlapped membership, I distinguish among
unipolar/overlapped, unipolar/non-overlapped, multipolar/overlapped, and multipolar/non-overlapped regions. Figure 4.15 shows that unipolar/overlapped regions and multipolar /overlapped
regions have proportionally higher number of intraregional organizations than unipolar/non-overlapped and multipolar/non-overlapped regions. It can be concluded that overlapped membership
makes a difference in overall patterns of cooperation and increases number of intraregional organizations within a given region.
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Figure 4.15. Intraregional IGOs per Country by Polarity and Overlapped Membership
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Figure 4.16 depicts results for the relationship between overlapped membership by polarity
and intraregional MIDs. From these results, multipolar/non-overlapped regions have proportionally the highest number of intraregional MIDs while multipolar/overlapped regions have proportionally the least number of intraregional MIDs. However, unipolar/overlapped regions have more
intraregional MIDs than unipolar non-overlapped regions. It can be concluded that even though
overlapped membership makes a difference in conflictive behaviors and decreases conflictive behaviors of regional powers in overlapped regions, still it does not make a strong difference as in
conflictive behaviors.
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Figure 4.16 Intraregional MIDs per Country by Polarity and Overlapped Membership
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I tested and analyzed the main general propositions of this study and the
results of testing of the each proposition by taking into account regional size. The first set of propositions, which are region-level adaptations of HST and deal with the relationship between the
existence of regional hegemon or great powers and intraregional cooperation are supported by the
results. Accordingly, regions with a regional hegemon have the largest number of intraregional
organizations while regions with no regional hegemon or great powers have the least number of
regional organizations. The second set of propositions, which are also region-level adaptations of
HST and deal with the relationship between the existence of regional hegemon or great powers
and intraregional MIDs are partially supported by the results. As opposed to expectation, in proposition 2a, regions with a hegemon had proportionally more MIDs than multipolar regions. As a
result, proposition 2a is not supported. However, regions without a regional hegemon or great
power(s) had the most MIDs and based on that, proposition 2b is supported. It can be concluded
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that the region-level adaptation of HST is partially supported by the results. The third set of propositions, which deal with the relationship between external global alliance and intraregional cooperation and conflict are also partially supported by the results. As opposed to what is expected in
proposition 3a, results show that regional cooperation is lower in regions where external alliance
exists while as expected, regional conflict is less in such regions. Lastly, the relationship between
overlapped regional hegemonic or great power memberships and intraregional conflict and cooperation are supported by the results. The next chapter will provide details and explanations, presenting more nuances for these results based on case studies.
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CHAPTER 5-SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF REGIONAL HEGEMON AND
REGIONAL GREAT POWERS
Regional Hegemons
As mentioned in Chapter 2, case studies for regional hegemons have been selected from
unipolar regional structures based on whether they are aligned with the global hegemon and
whether they are involved in a single region or multiple regions. Based on the typology presented
in Chapter 2, Brazil (an allied and non-overlapped case), South Africa (an un-allied and non-overlapped case) and India (an unallied and overlapped case) are the regional hegemons selected for
this study. For all three cases, I will provide a general information about each regional hegemon’s
place in the region and how it qualifies as a regional hegemon in terms of hard power capabilities
as well as three dimensions of power as proposed by Prys (2008): perception, projection, and provision. I will focus on similar issue areas of regional conflict and cooperation, such as the involvement of regional hegemons in interstate or intra-state conflicts and their roles in intraregional security or economic cooperation during the post-Cold War period.14 Examples include whether a
regional hegemon played a disruptive or suppressive role in a given conflict or whether a regional
hegemon led the formation of regional organizations or played no role in the formation or sustainment of regional organizations.
Brazil’s Hegemony in South America
Based on the definition of regional hegemony adopted by this study, Brazil is considered

14

This case study section examines strategies and behaviors of regional hegemons/great
powers in both inter-regional and intra-state conflicts. At this point it is important to note that those
intra-state conflicts, in some ways, inevitably have involved other regional countries. Since those
countries have had an interest in the outcome of those conflicts, they took action in those intrastate conflicts. These intra-state conflicts not only involve the internal dynamics of a country but
also involve regional actors.
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as a regional hegemon in South America. In terms of material power, Brazil is South America’s
largest country based on its military, economic, and demographic shares. In terms of ideational
power as proposed by Prys, Brazil assumes a hegemonic role in the region by accepting burdens
of hegemony such as the provision of regional public goods. Brazil’s foreign policy, which reflects
its willingness to act as the regional leader, highlights Brazil’s priority in the region: to create
prosperous and stable South America (Flemes 2009, 167). Moreover, the mediation services offered by Brazil are accepted by states like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, which indicates that Brazil is perceived to have a special role in the region. Brazil also meets the requirements of the projection and provision dimensions of power. Since the end of the Cold War, Brazil
has actively participated in the formation, development and sustainment of regional organizations
such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Union of Southern American Nations
(UNASUR), and the South American Defense Council (CDS) in UNASUR. Brazil has been adopting cooperative strategies and wielding its influence through these regional organizations. For Brazil, regional institutions are important since those institutions can serve as power bases for Brazil
to project power by structuring interactions and determining agendas. Especially under President
Lula da Silva, Brazil has increasingly engaged in regional politics. It has been actively trying to
engage with its neighbors and in regional politics such as being involved in conflict management
in the Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict, providing mediation services between Ecuador, Venezuela
and Columbia, and playing a central role and backing democracy in the Honduras crisis. By doing
so, Brazil has shown its hegemonic aspirations, its capability as a regional stabilizer and its willingness to lead the region.
Brazil in regional conflict and cooperation
From 1995 to 1998, Brazil played an active role in the process resolving the territorial
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dispute between Ecuador and Peru and took the lead in mediating the crisis. A long-standing border
dispute between Ecuador and Peru, which originated in Spanish Colonial times and led a conflict
between these two neighboring countries in 1941, reignited in 1995. South America has a colonial
past, and most conflicts occur in this region because of territory issues since there were no specific
methods those were applied by Spain when it divided the territory (Simmons 1999, 4). As with
most other conflicts within the region, the Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict also has its roots in this
boundary dispute, which dates back to the 19th century.
The Ecuador-Peru border dispute was thought to have been settled with the 1942 Rio de
Janeiro Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries (known as the Rio Protocol), which was
signed by Ecuador and Peru with the diplomatic efforts of a group of friendly nations: The United
States, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. The Rio Protocol defined the border between Peru and Ecuador. The treaty was signed by both parties and four friendly nations “as guarantors that the Protocol
would be faithfully executed…” (as quoted in Palmer 1997, 109).
However, the resolution of the conflict by the four mediating states in 1942 did not last
long, and in 1960, the Ecuadorian government completely rejected the Rio Protocol, stating that
the Protocol unfairly favored Peru and was accepted by Ecuador under the pressure from the US.
From 1960 to 1995, Ecuador made several diplomatic and military attempts to establish its presence in a contested region in the Upper Cenepa River Valley. In 1991, Ecuador redeployed its
military units into the remote Upper Cinema jungle, on the Peruvian side of the Rio Protocol line,
and constructed small base camps and helicopter zones (Palmer 1997, 119). Peru did not turn its
attention to its borders until January 1995 and neglected to patrol this border area adequately. In
January 1995, Peru moved its army patrols along the Cenepa River to reestablish a presence, and
on January 26, 1995, another border conflict erupted between Ecuador and Peru. The conflict

86
lasted nineteen days. Despite its short duration, the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru
“resulted in somewhere between 200 and 1,500 casualties, the loss of nine aircraft on the Peruvian
side and two on Ecuador’s, and estimated cost to both sides of up to one billion dollars” (Simmons
1999, p. 12). Both Ecuador and Peru did not want the conflict to escalate beyond Cenepa nor did
they want to give up their positions. The four Guarantors of the Rio Protocol became actively
engaged in looking for the dispute settlement between these two countries. They met in Brazil and
conducted negotiations for weeks. A peacekeeping process was composed of three stages (military,
procedural, and substantive) and began at the meeting in Brazil (Palmer 1997, 122). On February
17, 1995, the Peace Declaration at the Itamaraty Palace (Itamaraty Accord) was signed by Ecuador,
Peru and the representatives of the four Guarantors at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. The President
of Ecuador, Duran Ballin, agreed to recognize the Rio Protocol as a basis for a solution to the
conflict (Simmons 1999, 19).
The peace process provided opportunities for Brazil to exercise its leadership in the region
and to clear doubts of regional powers regarding to its regional role capabilities. Among the Four
Guarantors, Brazil especially played the role of lead Guarantor in resolving the conflict between
Ecuador and Peru. The territorial dispute of the 1940s between Ecuador and Peru led to regional
instability and tensions for decades in South America. The 1995 Ecuador-Peru dispute was also a
threat to regional stability since it posed dangers for regional trade and security. As the regional
hegemon of South America, working with other guarantors, Brazil took the lead in mediating and
settling the 1995 Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Brazil facilitated communication between the two
parties because the settlement of the border dispute was crucial for regional stability. Later, in
October, 1998 Brazil hosted the presidents of Ecuador and Peru. In this meeting, the presidents of
two countries as well as the Four Guarantors signed the Presidential Act of Brasilia to definitively
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resolve the remaining differences of the border dispute which also ended the peacekeeping operations in the disputed areas (Biato 2016, 621-622).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, regional hegemons may use different strategies to influence
secondary powers in their own regions. Some regional hegemons may adopt a coercive-power
based strategy while others may adopt a cooperative strategy by investing and participating in
regional organizations. Since the end of the Cold War, intraregional interactions in military, economic, and cultural spheres among South American countries have been marked by cooperative
attitudes. During this period, Brazil has become more involved multilaterally, especially in regional defense and security issues (Flemes 2009, 168). As was first defined in Chapter 1, Pedersen
(2002) proposes four possible strategies which are available to regional powers, and one of these
hegemonic strategies of leadership is co-operative hegemony, which involves engagement in cooperative arrangements. Regional hegemons may choose to pursue the strategy of regional institutionalization and want to share their power through institutions when the benefits of power sharing are higher than the benefits of not sharing. Brazil’s post-Cold War foreign policy can be defined by the adoption of cooperative hegemony since Brazil has pursued an institutionalist strategy
in its foreign relations with its neighbors and has become the main institution builder within the
region.
As political instability and security challenges have risen in South America, Brazil has
taken the lead and proposed to create South American Defense Council (CDS), a NATO-like defense alliance among South American countries. The goal of the formation of such an organization
was to promote and reorganize regional defense cooperation and craft a peace zone or security
community in South America (Vivares 2014, 46). The territorial dispute between Ecuador and
Colombia in 2008 definitively demonstrated the need for such a regional cooperation to maintain
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regional security. CDS was established in late 2008 as a part of the UNASUR, and the organization
has similar objectives to the conflict resolution mechanisms of the Organizations of American
States (OAS). The construction of CDS also aimed to exclude the US from this defense cooperation and diminish the US role in South American security affairs “as it [CDS] was promoting not
only militarization of the Colombian crisis, but also the adoption of destabilizing norms that diverged from the mainstream interpretations of international law favored by the legalistic diplomatic culture of South America” (Vivares 2014, 46).
CDS, as a collective security and defense project, aims to promote cooperation among UNASUR
members in defense and security issues which includes “the coordination on joint defense policies,
the exchange of armed forces personnel, the joint participation on United Nations peace operations,
among others” (Villa and Viana 2010, 103). According to Vivares (2014), CDS can be seen as a
vehicle for Brazil to promote stability in its sphere of influence with its role as a regional stabilizer.
By proposing and leading the creation of CDS, and being the dominant player in CDS, Brazil
proved its willingness to lead the region and to consolidate its dominant status in the region (45).
In addition to its leadership in institution-building and regionalism efforts, Brazil has also
sought to use cooperative rather than coercive means in its relations with its neighbors since “the
more the regional power makes use of coercive means, the greater the likelihood that this buy-in
will be the result of reluctant acceptance” (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 78). As Burges
(2009) also highlighted, Brazil does not impose its interests on secondary states within the region.
Rather, it follows a foreign policy route which is about coordination, consultation, and discussion
(54). As the above-mentioned cases of conflict and cooperation illustrate, Brazil plays the role of
leader, mediator and coordinator within the region, as expected by secondary powers and other
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countries in the region. Columbia, Argentina, and Venezuela are important South American regional powers, and these regional powers do not attempt to counter Brazil by increasing their capabilities or establishing new internal or external alliances (Schenoni 2015, 6). In order to reduce
regional contestation and to be accepted as a regional hegemon, Brazil has pursued a multilateral
strategy in its foreign relations. It involves neighboring countries in the process of forming a regional order, increases incentives for its neighbors to participate in the subsystem and avoids to
show any hegemonic intention (Teixeira 2012, 126). By doing this, Brazil reduces the sense of
threat to its neighboring countries.
South Africa’s Hegemony in Southern Africa
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the era of the rise of
liberal values such as democracy and human rights as well as interstate cooperation significantly
influenced and shaped South African domestic and foreign policies. South Africa held its first free
elections in 1994, and Nelson Mandela was elected as the first president of the post-apartheid era.
Mandela’s newly elected government aimed to form a democratic and free society in domestic
politics and adopted a multilateralist foreign policy strategy which reflected the rhetoric of the
post-Cold War era (Becker 2013, 247).
South Africa’s role in Southern Africa has been discussed by many scholars, and most
describe South Africa as a regional hegemon (Habib 2009; Prys 2009; Bischoff 2010; Nolte 2010;
Geldenhuys 2010; Tjemolane, Neethling and Schoeman 2012). Since Nelson Mandela’s rise to
power in 1994, South Africa has been playing a regional leader role by being the most powerful
military and economic actor in Southern African politics. Thabo Mbeki is an important figure in
South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy since he was an active deputy president under Mandela
from 1994 to 1999 and then became the second President of South Africa from 1999 to 2008.
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Especially after becoming president, Mbeki expanded the role of South Africa in Southern Africa,
and with his vision of an “African Renaissance”, Mbeki aimed to stabilize, reconstruct and redevelop the region during his term of office. Louw (2000) defines African Renaissance “as an effort
to remove the sources of conflict, restore its self-esteem and turn it [the region] into a zone of
economic prosperity, peace and stability” (1). Both Mandela and Mbeki believed that South Africa
has an important role in reaching these aims in the region. Moreover, the country’s initiatives such
as the reform of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Renaissance
program reflect its claim and self-perception of being a leader in Africa.
Since 1994, the priorities of South African foreign policy have been economic development, human rights, democracy, peace, security, stability, and multilateralism, which involve political partnerships and regional leadership (Habib 2009, 143; Tjemolane, Neethling and Schoeman
2012, 87). During its apartheid years, especially after the formation of SADC in 1980 which aimed
to reduce the economic interdependence of Southern African countries on South Africa, South
Africa sought to destabilize its neighbors and prevent them from forming any organization against
it. During this period, South Africa also engaged in interventions against its neighbors, such as
involvement in southern Angola (Saunders and Nagar 2013, 31). However, with the end of the
apartheid era and with the first democratic elections of 1994, South Africa engaged with its neighbors by making it priority to strengthen relations.
South Africa in regional conflict and cooperation
Since 1994, South Africa has been providing leadership in multilateral settings and playing
active roles in the formation and maintenance of regional agreements and organizations such as
the maintenance and development of SADC and South African Customs Union (SACU) (Burgess
2012, 207-208).
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SADC, as an intraregional organization, was formed in 1992, and South Africa was accepted as a new member in 1994 after moving from apartheid to majority rule.15 By being the
region’s most powerful military and economic power, South Africa became an important member
of SADC soon after its membership in the organization, and since then, South Africa has been
playing a critical leadership role in the organization. However, member countries in SADC such
as Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were cautious about the role of South Africa because of
its military and economic aggression during the apartheid-era, and its aggressive past put postapartheid South Africa’s acceptability and legitimacy in question (Matlosa 1997, 121-122). The
newly elected government of post-apartheid South Africa was also aware of the conflictual image
of South Africa and acted as a Big Brother rather than a regional hegemon in order to assert its
influence in the region and to promote cooperation among member states of SADC (Saunders and
Nagar 2013, 32). In regional platforms, South Africa stated that it would build conditions for a
collective leadership and rely on the notion of collective leadership on regional matters. In 1996,
Mbeki highlighted South Africa’s rejection of hegemonic relations in its interaction with Southern
Africa and expressed that
The Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South Africa in terms of
their own development. They expect that we interact with them as a partner and ally not as
a regional super power, so that what we achieve, in terms of political, security and economic relations, is balanced and mutually beneficial. (Mbeki 1996)
South Africa has preferred to deal with regional conflicts through the use of regional organizations, mainly SADC, and SADC as the most important and developed regional organization
in Southern Africa has been the first responder to conflicts in the region. The SADC Organ for

15

SADC was formerly Southern African Development Co-Coordinating Conference
(SADCC). The reason for the transformation of SADCC into SADC was to deepen the economic
integration of Southern Africa. Today, SADC not only focuses on economic issues, but it also has
a peace and security-oriented agenda.
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Politics, Defence and Security (the Organ) is responsible for promoting peace and security within
the SADC region with its conflict management and conflict prevention capacities including a regional peacekeeping center as well as election monitoring and mediating inter and intrastate disputes (Albuquerque and Wiklund 2015, 1). The Organ was established in 1996; however, it did
not become active until 2001 when an extraordinary SADC summit was held, and the inclusion of
the Organ under the control of SADC was approved. This summit not only approved the inclusion
of the Organ, but it also restructured SADC institutions since SADC had a decentralized structure
in which “most of its projects were national projects with limited regional impact” (Prys 2012, 53).
South Africa was the leader of this reform process and strongly supported those progressive
measures.
In the post-Cold War period, South Africa used its financial and military resources to stabilize the region, including peace and security interventions. Zondi (2012) claims that “South Africa’s stabilization agenda has three key pillars: mediation, post-conflict development and peacekeeping” (17). As a responsible regional power, South Africa was involved in negotiations in multiple countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. It was also involved in conflict resolution in Southern Africa such as intervening in Lesotho in 1998 to help stabilize a domestic
crisis. The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho led to enormous controversies. The South African
government claimed that the aim of the intervention was to prevent a military coup and restore
democracy; however, the use of force in conflict management caused harm to South Africa’s image
as a regional peacemaker (de Conning 2000). At this point, providing a brief historical overview
of the Lesotho crisis, then examining South Africa’s involvement and role in this crisis, will be
helpful in understanding South Africa’s regional foreign policy in its own region.
Since its independence in 1965, Lesotho has had political instability, and the country has
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confronted political tension in the aftermath of the highly disputed parliamentary elections in 1998.
The May 1998 election results, which claimed the party Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)
as victorious, were repudiated by the Basutoland Congress Party, the Basotho National Party and
the Marematlou Freedom Party. Following the disputed victory of LCD, opposition political parties mobilized their supporters to occupy the capital, Maseru (Prys 2012, 109-110). As the region’s
largest military and economic power, South Africa took the lead and invited Botswana and Zimbabwe to form a mediation to settle the dispute. During this time period, opposition groups staged
protests and demanded the resignation of the prime minister of the LCD and the monarch to dissolve the government (Southall and Fox 1999, 670). As mass demonstrations intensified and civil
disorder increased, the Lesotho government lost control of the crisis. On September 16, 1998, the
newly elected Lesotho prime minister, Pakalitha Mosisili requested SADC military assistance to
help in maintaining political stability and preventing a military coup in Lesotho by claiming that
“we have a coup on our hands. The only intervention I can and do request urgently is of a military
nature” (as quoted in Nathan 2012, 82). After this request, South Africa and Botswana decided to
launch a joint military operation called Operation Boleas (Prys 2012, 110). On September 22,
1998, troops from the South African National Defence Forces (SANDF) entered Lesotho to restore
law and order, and on September 23, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) joined the invasion to
take control of the capital Maseru. However, SANDF met with unanticipated resistance from sections of the Lesotho army and supporters of opposition parties. The political turmoil and tension
in Lesotho continued for weeks and resulted in the deaths of soldiers from Lesotho and South
Africa, and much of Maseru was destroyed. Violence began to subside with the disarmament of
the mutineers and after the rival parties reached a peace agreement. An all-party Interim Political
Authority (IPA) was formed by members of all political parties to pave the way for a new election
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(Selinyane 2006, 71).
The Lesotho crisis was settled after a South African-led military intervention, which was
important for South Africa since it was the first military intervention of the post-apartheid regime
in a conflict beyond its borders. Since its first election in 1994, South Africa had been looking for
peaceful solutions or dialogue to deal with regional conflicts. However, different from other interventions, South Africa used its coercive power to restore security in Lesotho; however, there are
some controversies regarding South Africa’s armed intervention in the Lesotho crisis in terms of
legitimacy of the intervention and South Africa’s motivations for the intervention. On the one
hand, critics claim that South Africa took unilateral action by not consulting the SADC before
intervening in Lesotho, which violated SADC’s commitment to multilateralism. On the other hand,
the South African officials claimed that the action was taken under the SADC auspices. The South
African officials claimed that
Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa were mandated to act on behalf of SADC to restore
the democratically elected government. After intensive negotiations and the threat of military intervention by SADC forces, the democratically elected government was restored to
power and the soldiers returned to their barracks. (as quoted in Tavares 2001, 158)
There have also been conflicting views regarding South Africa’s intervention with regard
to whether realist or liberal principles led to the military intervention. On the one hand, critics
claim that South Africa’s strategic national interests motivated the military intervention, mainly to
defend a water resource. On the other hand, South African officials claimed that South Africa
intervened in the crisis for humanitarian reasons to restore stability in the country and to rescue
Lesotho from a coup (Prys 2012, 113-114). On September 22, 1998, acting South African President Mangosuthu Buthelezi made a speech in the South African Parliament saying “the aim of the
intervention is to restore stability as soon and as quickly as possible and withdraw… as soon as
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that has been achieved” (Irish Times, 23 September 1998). de Coning (2000) explains the objectives of the South African intervention in Lesotho crisis as “to prevent a military coup, to disarm
the mutineers and to create a safe environment for the diplomatic initiative to find a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Lesotho” (39). Indeed, the South Africa-led operation succeeded in
achieving the desired results and led to the creation of a stable environment in Lesotho as well as
restored law and order which enabled negotiations between the rival parties.
As the preponderant regional power, South Africa played an active participant role in resolving a
regional conflict by responding to the Lesotho Prime Minister’s request for help. Selinyane (2006)
explains South Africa’s role in the Lesotho crisis as follows
South Africa is unequivocally committed to creating peace and stability on the continent.
Such a project can only materialize under the leadership of a hegemonic state that not only
stands ready to enforce it, including through deployment of force, but also ploughs in its
resources to back up this ideal (79).
However, the use of coercive power and the military action which was taken in the name of SADC
without appropriate decision-making procedures led to the description of the intervention as “a
loss of innocence” since it announced “the arrival of a very different South Africa; Big Brother is
bashful no longer” (Fabricius 1998, 14).
As mentioned earlier, apartheid South Africa was an aggressive regional hegemon which
attempted to destabilize its neighbors such as Angola, Botswana, and Zimbabwe both politically
and economically by fomenting civil war and political unrest. However, post-apartheid South African presidents have been highlighting the notion of collective leadership on regional issues not
to be perceived as a regional hegemon which wants to control or dominate its neighbors. Despite
efforts for a collective leadership, South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho has led its neighbors to question its cooperative and anti-hegemonic approach.
Overall, while the intervention in Lesotho was military in nature, and it is postulated that
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South Africa’s intervention was a unilateral action, South Africa still was able to provide a regional
public good by intervening in Lesotho to prevent a military coup and restore democracy. Moreover, South Africa showed its ability as well as its readiness to play a leading role and use its resources to secure political stability in the region (Prys 2012, 116). South Africa’s intervention in
Lesotho was a success since it was able to create stability and peace in the region. The priorities
of South African foreign policy are still human rights and democracy but South Africa has started
to engage with its neighbors with greater caution. The Mbeki period of South African foreign
policy mostly focused on political and economic stability for prosperity in the region and South
Africa’s own success. South Africa started to take part in peacekeeping activities and deployed its
troops in Southern African countries which are in conflict situations to achieve regional peace.
India’s Hegemony in South Asia
Since the beginning of the 1990s, India has started to have growing importance and presence in regional and international scenes because of its rapid and continued economic growth after
the 1991 economic reforms. Apart from its economic power, India is also the dominant power in
South Asia in terms of defense capacities in addition to its physical and demographic size. In terms
of hard power capabilities, with its dominant military as well as economic and demographic power,
India clearly has the capacity to dominate the region. In addition to hard power capabilities, analyzing ideational indicators of regional hegemony (perception, projection and provision) based on
the typology developed by Prys and adopted by this study to identify regional powers will give a
clear determination of India’s power status in South Asia and what India means for the region.
With its dominant material capabilities, India has been playing a leading role in the region
since the end of the Cold War. It is willing and ready to accept the burdens of hegemony. For
example, India has been providing development assistance to its neighboring countries (Prys 2008,
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8). India’s hegemony is accepted by most of its neighbors, such as Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, and the Maldives, which have some sort of political and economic reliance on India
(Khan 2008, 29). However, India’s regional hegemony has been contested by Pakistan since India’s independence in 1947. Pakistan has been openly challenging India’s supremacy, which has
led to crises and wars between these two biggest powers in the region. After independence, Pakistan and India’s ongoing rivalry revolved around the unresolved status of Kashmir. (Buzan 2002,
2-3). Over time, Pakistan has pursued different strategies to oppose India’s regional hegemony.
Blarel and Ebert (2014) state that “Pakistan’s behavioral repertoire can be ranged along a continuum that alternated from open resistance to India’s hegemony to (reluctant) acquiescence of the
asymmetric structure of the existing regional system” (224). They define the period from 1947 to
1971 as one of the greatest periods of political and military resistance to Indian regional hegemony
while the period from 1971 to the late 1980s was one of acquiescence to India’s regional position.
However, in the late 1980’s, Pakistan started to pursue the strategy of indirect resistance to Indian
regional hegemony (224). Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought four wars and had several
severe crises. In addition to military rivalry, nuclear and missile rivalries started between the
hegemon and the challenger with the latter’s missile development activities in the mid-1980s
(Buzan 2002, 8). In the post-Cold War period, the rivalry between the two largest states led to
continuous political tensions and instability in the region. With nuclear weapon tests of India and
Pakistan on May 1998, security concerns increased in the region. Even though India’s hegemonic
status is still contested by Pakistan, India has now been accepted as the regional hegemon by its
other neighbors.
In terms of the projection dimension which deals with how regional hegemons exercise
power over their neighboring countries and project their interests and values onto their neighbors,
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India chose to exercise its power through unilateral and bilateral means. Multilateral forums have
also been used by India, but its multilateral relations with its neighbors are limited to economic
issues. In 2004, the Indian Prime Minister Singh described India’s foreign policy as “cooperative
pluralism” (Sinha 2015, 17). In terms of an economic policy approach, India participated in regional agreements and multilateral organizations including the South Asian Free Trade Agreement
(SAFTA). In terms of security, on the other hand, India has preferred to secure bilateral relationships with neighboring countries, which has led to the lack of any multilateral security arrangement
in the region. Indeed, India is a member of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC); however, it has not sought to resolve regional security problems through SAARC.
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) explain the reason for India’s lack of interest in the resolution
of security issues through SAARC as follows
India’s agreement to join SAARC was predicated upon the idea that bilateral issues (even
critical ones to regional stability, such as the Kashmir dispute) or any security related issues
would not be within the domain of SAARC. Rather, the organization would address coordination in the areas of agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology
and health and population activities. (200)
While South Asia is viewed as a region of political instability and tensions, India has a
paramount interest in maintaining stability and security there and “it [India] does aspire to act as
the security manager in the region…” (Ayoob 2000, 27). This desire was reflected in I. K. Gujral’s
Inaugural Address in January, 1997, entitled “Security Concerns in Asia in the Early 21st Century”. As the Minister of External Affairs, Gujral formulated a set of policies in this speech by
emphasizing a conflict-free cooperative order in South Asia. With this new foreign policy, the aim
was to achieve better relations with India’s neighbors by reducing tensions and increasing cooperation between and among them (Sabur 2001, 143-144). The main principles of the Gujral Doctrine
are:
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(1) as the largest nation in South Asia, India must show a big heart. With neighbors, India
must not ask for reciprocity, but should give all that it can in good faith and trust; (2) no
South Asian country would allow its territory to be used against the interest of another
country; (3) no country would interfere in the internal affairs of another; (4) countries of
South Asia must settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. (Chatterjee
2010, 220)
Ayoob (2000) claims that “[the] policy of non-reciprocity is an important step in legitimizing India’s preeminent status in the region by demonstrating its willingness and capacity to act as
the benevolent provider of public goods in South Asia” (30). The Gujral doctrine helped to improve India’s relations with its neighbors and showed benevolent and integrating aims of India as
the dominant regional power since India behaved as a non-interfering benevolent hegemon.
India in regional conflict and cooperation
The absence of capable regional security organizations to manage security issues in South
Asia and India’s outstanding position in the region led it to step in the long-standing civil war in
the region. The Sri Lankan civil war was a long-lasting ethnic-based civil war which started in the
beginning of 1980s and ended in 2009 with a violent military victory over the Tamil insurgency
group. In the Sri Lankan civil war, the insurgency group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), fought against the Sinhalese majority state to establish an independent Tamil state called
Tamil Eelam (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 117-118). Since the beginning of the civil war
in 1983, there have been several on and off conflict periods between majority and minority groups.
Indeed, expectations for a long-lasting peace heightened with the Ceasefire Agreement which followed the declaration of a cease-fire in 2001. However, the peaceful atmosphere did not last long
when hostilities were renewed in November 2005, which led to the “Fourth Eelam War” in July
2006. Prior to 1991, India was involved in the Sri Lankan civil war and made attempts to mediate
between ethnic majority and minority groups. With the failure of these conflict management efforts, India entered into an accord with Sri Lanka called the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July 1987
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to establish peace in Sri Lanka (Manoharan 2011, 228). The Accord was an important attempt
since it was the first major peace initiative in the long history of the Sri Lankan ethnic issue. As
per the peace accord, India sent the India Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka to monitor the
ceasefire and supervise the disarmament of LTTE. The Indian military also carried out operations
against LTTE during the peacekeeping operation. However, LTTE refused to disarm, and it soon
attacked the IPKF. India abandoned peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka, and Indian forces
fought LTTE for three years, which resulted in over 1,100 casualties in Indian forces and their
withdrawal of from the island (Destradi 2012a, 65). Following the end of the war between LTTE
and the Indian forces, the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a LTTE suicide bomber
in 1991 led to India’s adoption of a passive approach to the Sri Lankan ethnic turmoil. Destradi
(2012b) explains the reasons for India’s hands-off policy in the Sri Lankan civil from 1991 to 2006
through historical and domestic factors. As she puts it,
regarding the former [historical factors], the figure of India’s peacemaking efforts in the
1980s and its banning of the LTTE after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in
1991 made it politically difficult for India to act as an effective conflict manager because
it could not have any direct contacts to the LTTE. Domestically, India could not openly
support the Sri Lankan state’s war efforts because of pressure exerted on the central government by regional Tamil parties in Tamil Nadu. (597)
The Fourth Eelam War between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE broke out in 2006, and
India kept abiding by its noninterference policy until the violence escalated in Sri Lanka in 2007.
Indian military forces did not actively engage in the final military conflict between the Sri Lankan
forces and LTTE, but it supported Sri Lankan forces in 2008-2009 by providing military supplies
to Sri Lanka, sharing intelligence against the LTTE and training Sri Lankan security personnel to
defeat LTTE (596). After over three decades of the armed conflict, the Sri Lankan civil war ended
in May 2009 with the Sri Lankan Army’s gaining control over all LTTE-controlled territories and
the death of the LTTE leader, which led to dismantlement of the group.
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With the military defeat of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan ethnic issue’s armed wing came to an end.
Since ethnic issues were critical components of the India- Sri Lanka relationship, at the end of the
war the bilateral relationship between the two countries took on a new dimension. As Manoharan
(2011) puts it “… for the first time in the past three decades, India-Sri Lanka relations are being
conducted without the militant group in the picture” (230).
As the regional hegemon with the responsibility to promote peace and security in the region, India involved itself in the Sri Lankan civil war. However, India’s foreign policy to address
the crisis and its use the military to stabilize the intra-state order in Sri Lanka has been criticized
by many foreign government officials and scholars. First of all, in terms of its early involvement
in the ethnic issue, India showed assertive efforts in dealing with a regional security-related issue.
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) define India’s conflict management efforts in the Sri Lankan
ethnic turmoil as “individualized, sporadic, and indecisive” (200). Moreover, since the region lacks
effective multilateral security organizations, India acted unilaterally in conflict management.
Moreover, India has been the most significant external actor in the Sri Lankan ethnic turmoil since Sri Lanka is vital for Indian national security and interests. India shares borders, economic interests and ethnic ties with Sri Lanka. On the regional level, India sought to mitigate and
eliminate a threat to regional stability since security dynamics at the regional level are significantly
affected by intra-state tensions and political instabilities. In addition to these factors, India’s military and political power and its position as the regional hegemon raised expectations regarding
India’s role in conflict management in the Sri Lankan ethnic issue (Destradi, 2012b, 599). In contrast to the expectations, India failed to show a coherent and mature response to the ethnic turmoil
in its immediate neighbor. Even in 2000, when Sri Lanka appealed to its neighboring countries for
support in its Second Battle of Elephant Pass which resulted from LTTE’s reoccupation of the
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strategic Elephant Pass camp, India refused to provide military assistance and kept implementing
its noninterference policy (Prys 2012, 163). Despite its strategic security as well as economic interests and regional status, India had been acting as a bystander since 1991 probably because of its
failed efforts in the past when its efforts to restore peace resulted in the escalation of violence.
With its failure of intervention to find a political solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic issue, India
showed that it was unable to bring peace in Sri Lanka when it acted alone.
While the Sri Lankan case study involves behavior and the on-and-off engagement of India in a
South Asian intra-state crisis, the above-mentioned regional cooperation case demonstrates India’s
role in economic multilateral initiatives in the region. Since independence in 1947, political tensions between India and Pakistan have led to a decline in South Asian trade shares. The lack of
trust among neighboring countries because of the troubled relations among them has prevented
those countries from developing export promotion strategies and has kept trade levels low (Batra
2007, 3878). Low levels of intraregional cooperation started to change in the post-Cold War era
with Nepal and Bangladesh’s transition to democracy and a few other South Asian countries’ liberalizing their domestic trade regimes by the early 1990s (Prys 2012, 145).
India’s role in economic integration in South Asia is important for its neighbors because
of its predominant economic capability and geographical location. Despite political tensions, South
Asian countries have been able to take steps toward economic integration, and regional economic
cooperation improved relatively significantly in the post-Cold War period. India has signed bilateral free trade agreements with Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. In addition to strengthening bilateral
links, India has also taken several measures to facilitate intraregional trade among South Asian
countries since the liberalization of its economy. One of those initiatives was the creation of a
regional free trade agreement called South Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA), which is an
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intra-SAARC economic cooperation. SAFTA was formulated during the course of SAARC negotiations and ratified in January 2006 by India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka. The agreement aimed the reduction of regional tariffs and turning South Asia into
a free trade area (Batra 2007, 3880). Despite these efforts and implementation of SAFTA, intraSAARC trade levels are still considered low and limited, partly because the smaller states lack
sufficient productivity and buying power to stimulate trade.
According to some scholars, SAFTA has failed to achieve the expected results due to its
narrow scope since it focused only on tariff reductions and excluded investment or financial aid
and restrictions within the agreement (Karim 2014, 309) while others argue that the failure of the
economic integration in the region is a consequence of political tensions between India and Pakistan which are the largest regional economies (Khan, Shaheen and Yusuf 2009, 159). Indeed, both
factors played important roles in the ineffectiveness of SAFTA. At the SAARC summit in Bhutan
in 2010, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan highlighted a fundamental problem by stating that “We
have created institutions for regional cooperation, but we have not yet empowered them adequately
to enable them to be more proactive” (as quoted in Malone, 2011, 105). The SAARC members
developed bilateral trade agreements prior to the formation of SAFTA, and there are also some
other trade agreements in progress. India’s trade relations within the region are mostly based on
these bilateral trade agreements.
In addition to problems with SAFTA itself in terms of its scope and effectiveness, the link
between security and economic relations is also important to mention. India has focused on the
promotion of economic interests in its relations with neighboring countries, and security initiatives
have always remained limited in India’s regional agenda. However, security and the economy are
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interdependent, and as Dent (2016) puts it, a “regional security arrangement can bring greater stability and trust amongst a regional community of nations, without which economic regionalism
may be very difficult to achieve” (23). India has pursued a unilateralist foreign policy and developed bilateral relationships with its neighbors with respect to regional security issues.
A Comparison of Regional Hegemons: Brazil, South Africa and India
Based on how this study conceptualizes regional hegemony, Brazil in South America,
South Africa in Southern Africa and India in South Asia are classified as regional hegemons. In
addition to material preponderance, this study looks at the influence in regional governance, the
ability and willingness to provide leadership, and the provision of public goods in order to classify
a country as a regional hegemon. This section will compare the behaviors of regional hegemons
in their sphere of influence by focusing on historical experiences of the regions under study as well
as the regional strategic settings and their effects on the behaviors of regional hegemons in regional
conflict and cooperation. Moreover, the implementation of security and stability by regional
hegemons, the relationship between regional hegemons and external powers, and overlapped memberships of regional hegemons will be the focus of comparison.
In comparing the behaviors of regional hegemons, this study considers that the cases under
study have different historical experiences, such as concerning colonialism (Prys 2010, 9). In all
three cases, the legacy of colonial rule has affected the stability of the regional order after independence. In all three regions, colonial legacies still have effects on territorial claims and ethnic
conflicts. Historical legacies also affect regional institutionalization as shown in the cases. For
example, in South America, neighboring countries have common historic experiences such as a
colonial past, military dictatorships and the following processes of democratization. These historical experiences have helped to delineate the region and strengthened the regional bond among
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South American countries (Flemes 2009, 169). In Southern Africa, historical commonality across
SADC members has also strengthened regional cooperation even though these countries have cultural, language and ethnic differences. Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015) explain the relationship
between shared historical legacy and regional cooperation as follows: “the joint struggle for independence and common opposition to apartheid has resulted in a sense of brotherhood among
SADC members, which in many ways defines the nature of regional cooperation” (1). Ethnic wars
in Southern Africa are related to racial issues since most countries in the region were British colonies, and British colonialism was replaced with racist dominance in most countries, such as South
Africa and Zimbabwe. In South Asia, the British Empire left a colonial legacy of a border dispute
which has been unresolved since 1947. The source of the unresolved conflict between India and
Pakistan is arbitrarily drawn borders in Kashmir. In this region, historical legacy negatively affected regional integration, and the unresolved conflict led to regional instability and the lack of
trust among its neighbors toward India’s benevolent aspirations.
Regional settings within which three regional hegemons operate also differ greatly. As
mentioned in brief assessments of the behaviors of regional hegemons, while India asserts its influence over its smaller neighboring states and has relatively good relations with them, it also
confronts a challenger, Pakistan. South Asia hosts a strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan
which has led to instability and insecurity in the region. India and Pakistan have engaged in several
armed conflicts since 1947, which has led to the expansion of military capabilities of both countries
and the lack of advanced regional integration. Even though there is a wide power gap between
India and Pakistan, both states are nuclear powers which further complicates the establishment of
a secure regional order. Since India does not want any crisis to escalate to nuclear war, India’s
responses to Pakistan’s rivalry are limited. This long-standing rivalry leads to the lack of trust
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among neighboring countries, now extending all the way to Afghanistan, and an insecure regional
order, combining to result in ineffective regional cooperation which in turn limits India’s role as a
stabilizer. On the other hand, in the regions dominated by Brazil and South Africa, there are no
immediate threats to their security or regional hegemonic status, though Argentina contains the
potential for future development along these lines. As a result, security and military policies prioritize regional stability by the formation of security cooperation with neighboring countries. In
contrast to South Asian countries, South American and South African countries strengthen the
defense capabilities of their regions through security cooperation instead of strengthening their
own military capabilities against their neighbors. Brazil’s and South Africa’s historical backgrounds also affect their foreign policy priorities. For example, South Africa is concerned about
apartheid’s legacy of ethnic conflicts and their spillover effects. As a result, South Africa has prioritized conflict management and resolution in its neighboring countries and has been playing a
very active role in peacekeeping and security operations to prevent political instability in the region. Even though there is no actual conventional threat against South Africa by its neighboring
states, the presence of regional inter-state and intrastate conflicts have led South Africa to shape
its foreign policy strategies accordingly and prioritize conflict mediation and peacekeeping when
dealing with regional security issues (Flemes and Vaz, 2011, 16).
In contrast to South Asia and Southern Africa, South America is a relatively peaceful and
politically stable region. As mentioned in the case above, Brazil also provides relative stability
through regional conflict mediation, conflict prevention and security cooperation initiatives
(Flemes and Wehner 2015, 167). Despite the differences in regional settings, Brazil and South
Africa have prioritized regional cooperation, multilateralism and regional security as foreign policy strategies, and both regional hegemons are involved in international organizations to promote
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peace and security in their regions. India, on the other hand, follows a multilateral route in its
overlapping region and has more developed relations in extra-regional multilateral platforms
which will be mentioned below.
These brief case studies show that these three states followed different routes in regional
cooperative initiatives and conflict resolution. Both Brazil and South Africa played active roles in
the conflict management of their neighbors and showed their ability and willingness to assert influence through military and non-military means. On the other hand, India also engaged in conflict
resolution process in Sri Lanka and highlighted its desire for a peaceful settlement of the crisis.
However, India’s support for the Sri Lankan government’s military efforts showed a disposition
to dealing with the crisis through both negotiation and force, revealing India’s preference for stability over peace (Destradi 2012a, 84). Resort to the military instrument showed India’s inability
to broker a peaceful resolution process. Moreover, India’s on-and-off engagement in resolving the
crisis showed the lack of ability to influence security dynamics in its immediate vicinity. In terms
of multilateral initiatives and regional cooperation, both Brazil and South Africa are actively engaged in their neighborhoods by forming new regional organizations and developing the existent
ones; however, India has not really developed cooperative initiatives with a focus on the South
Asian complex, and it has been relatively ineffective in advancing a regional security order.
Even though India has taken some steps to facilitate regional integration, these initiatives have
been limited to economic terms, specifically intra-regional trade. According to Stewart-Ingersoll
and Frazier (2012), two characteristics of Indian foreign policy have led to the lack of influence
and focus on regional security orders. First, India’s foreign policy focus is external rather than
regional since it is aimed at a global recognition with the confidence that it already possesses a
hegemonic position in South Asia. Second, India prefers to pursue the route of bilateralism over
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multilateralism in its relations with neighboring countries. India adopted both bilateral and multilateral approaches in its economic relationship while preferring bilateral relations on security issues (91-92).
It is also important to mention that both Brazil and South Africa are aware of their neighboring countries’ concerns about their bid for hegemony, which in turn have affected both countries’ foreign policy instruments in their relations with their neighbors. Brazil avoided showing
any hegemonic intention because it is aware that its neighbors have fear of hegemonic exploitation
which could lead to a coordinated attack against Brazil. Because of the apartheid regime’s aggressive hegemonic ambitions within the region, post-apartheid South Africa also rejected any hegemonic interactions in its relations with the region and prioritized partnership with the rest of the
region. Both Brazil and South Africa adopted multilateral approaches to reduce these fears and
worked within multilateral institutions to strengthen their regional influence (Stewart-Ingersoll and
Frazier, 2012). South Africa and Brazil can be classified as cooperative and benevolent hegemons.
At this point it is important to note that today South Africa under Jacob Zuma has not really
changed its foreign policy preferences and still increasingly engages with the region. On the other
hand, Brazil’s new foreign policy under Michel Temer signals a change in Brazil’s foreign policy
strategy by its focus on bilateral rather than multilateral relations with South American countries
which will be discussed in the next chapter under similarities and differences between global and
regional hegemonic strategies.
Regional dynamics and the position of regional hegemon are different in South Asia compared to
the other two regions. India’s relationship with Pakistan has led to the lack of trust of India’s
hegemonic ambitions among its neighbors. Based on its dominant hard power capabilities, with
exception of Pakistan, the application of India’s hegemonic intentions towards its neighboring
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countries is easy for India, but still both India’s unwillingness to pursue a multilateral approach in
its foreign policy and neighboring countries’ fear and insecurity about India’s hegemonic status
with the power asymmetry hinder the formation and development of cooperative activities in the
region. In contrast to the other two regional hegemons, India has favored unilateralism in addressing regional problems and failed to create regional consensus on these problems.
In light of HST, Brazil and South Africa have been playing a stabilizer role, providing
public goods and having the capability and will for the hegemonic role. Both countries are able to
provide security and economic goods for regional stability. However, HST is not that applicable
to South Asia mainly because of Pakistan-India tensions and nuclear status which prevent the regional hegemon from ensuring stability in the region. Brazil and South Africa interfered in interstate and intra-state crises and provided the public good of regional stability through assuming the
role of mediators and seeking to find political viable solutions in those crises. Even though India
is the predominant power in the region, it has not brought neighboring countries together to develop a cooperative approach and provide security management initiatives for common security
concerns such as ethnic conflicts, insurgencies and terrorism (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012,
90). India has been the central player in regional dynamics; however, it has failed to address the
management of security mechanisms for a stable regional order, and its inflexibility regarding
negotiating the Kashmir issue has retarded any prospects for meaningful regional integration.
Regional hierarchies are subordinate to the global hierarchy; hence, they cannot be studied
in isolation. Whether there are any effects of external influences on the dynamics of a given regional subsystem and what limits or opportunities those effects pose on the behavior of regional
hegemons are important to mention in order to understand regional subsystems. Stewart -Ingersoll
and Frazier (2012) identify three ways in which extra-regional great powers can possibly involve
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in regional dynamics.
First, they [extra-regional great powers] can have little or no involvement in the RSC [Regional Security Complexes]. In this case the security order can be adequately explained by
internal RSC dynamics alone…Second, extra-regional great powers can more actively involve themselves within the RSC by seeking to influence the behavior of regional states in
terms of foreign policy… The third type of influence that extra-regional actors have upon
regional security dynamics comes in the form of more direct intervention, either through
substantial support to regional members or through actual military penetration. (223)
Of course, one must also note that extra-regional powers can be drawn into and become mired in
the vortex of regional politics, often without a full understanding of the complex local forces in
play as was the case in the US involvement in Iraq.
When we take into consideration the interaction between extra-regional great powers and
regional hegemons in their regions, South Asia is the region that has, at least in the post-Cold War
context, experienced the strongest external interference by global great powers. As stated in the
above-mentioned Gujral doctrine, India defined South Asia as its sphere of influence and opposed
any external interference in the region’s affairs. Despite its concerns about external interference,
especially in the aftermath of the Cold War period, developments in the region such as India’s
economic liberalization, Pakistan and India’s nuclearization, and Afghanistan’s role in the 9/11
attacks increased the US interests in the region. Today, Pakistan is still formally allied with the
US, and India has bilateral security and defense ties with the US, while China plays an impinging
role from the East.
During the Cold War period, Pakistan was allied with the US, and the US supported Pakistan with military assistance, even while drawing the line on becoming directly involved in the
India-Pakistani dispute. Because of US and Chinese support for Pakistan during the Cold War,
India forged defense ties with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union, which became an important
source of economic and military assistance for India (Mazumdar 2011, 167). With the collapse of
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the Soviet Union, India lost a significant economic and military supplier and reoriented its foreign
policy once again, developing closer ties with the West, and in the 2000s, India and the US cooperated as well on counterterrorism and regional security issues (168). Especially with the Next
Step in Strategic Partnership Initiative in 2005, India-US bilateral relationships and strategic partnerships expanded. The US became involved in South Asia by taking on counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012,
147). Moreover, the lack of a security cooperation agreement in the region and the ineffectiveness
of the existing ones have put enormous economic and military burdens on India in regional conflict
management. The involvement of external powers in the region’s security affairs has therefore
been articulated by Indian policymakers. With the policy of “security multilateralism”, India has
aimed to take initiatives for the regional multilateral security process by including external powers
in South Asian security-related issues (Dash 2008, 107).
Only Brazil, among the cases under study, has a formal alliance with the US; however, the
OAS pact has not markedly increased US interference in Brazil’s sphere of influence since 1990
although Washington did become more assertive during President Chavez’s tenure in Venezuela
and in combatting Colombian drug cartels. Indeed, the US role in South America has declined
significantly in recent years (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 142). Teixeira (2012) explains
Brazil’s success in reducing US penetration in South America by claiming that
it [Brazil] has reduced the benefits of subsystem change by acting as a “sub-hegemonic
state” or a “hegemonic stabilizer” at the regional level, thus preempting the role that could
potentially be played by the United States, and consequently reducing the opportunities
and incentives for US interference. (38-39).
As in the above-mentioned Brazilian regional cooperation case, with new security arrangements
such as the South American Security Council (CDS), Brazil aimed to limit the US influence on
regional dynamics and to address regional crises without US interference, which could enable the

112
establishment of its leadership in the region. In this case, Brazil saw the US as a threat to its regional autonomy; hence, it sought to decrease the US penetration in the region through a security
organization as well as the MERCOSUR trade pact. Indeed, the US supported the formation of a
regional organization under Brazilian leadership by stating that “We welcome efforts by Brazil
and our other regional partners to establish economic and security mechanisms such as the South
American Defense Council” (as quoted in Brown 2013, 45).
Relations with the US as an alliance partner still remain important for Brazil, and they
interact through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The US and Brazil have strong bilateral relations on a wide range of security and economic issues, such as a civilian nuclear cooperation in
the 1990s, the cooperation in Organization of American States (OAS) as well as negotiations in
free trade agreements (Flemes 2009, 165). Until recently, defense ties between two countries were
not as strong as economic ones; however, with the Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in
2010, Brazil and the US enhanced cooperation on defense issues which resulted from overlapping
national and regional security interests including terrorism. In the long-term, the defense agreement could help Brazil fulfill its goals to overcome regional and global threats. Moreover, as an
alliance partner, Brazil’s defense cooperation with the US helps Brazil modernize its armed forces,
which can in turn facilitate management of regional challenges and maintain a more stable regional
order (Downes 2012, 2).
Brazil’s regional hegemonic strategies including non-intervention, defense of peace and
peaceful settlement of conflicts, which also shape its interactions with the US and affect its decisions on international issues. For example, in 2010, Brazil criticized sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, and Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Brazil’s representative to the United Nations said
“We do not see sanctions as an effective instrument in this case,” (MacFarquhar, 2010), and then
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added that “[the sanctions] will most probably lead to the suffering of the people of Iran and will
play into the hands of people on all sides who do not want dialogue to prevail” (as quoted in Brown
2013, 44). As a holder of a temporary Security Council seat, Brazil voted against the sanctions on
Iran. In this circumstance, Brazil applied its regional strategic logic, which supports benevolent
rather than coercive strategy on the decision for the US promoted sanctions regime.
In comparison with South Asia and South America, Southern Africa enjoys relatively higher autonomy in regional politics since South Africa is relatively freer in its sphere of influence and does
not really confront significant external involvement in regional dynamics. Southern Africa is not
a US priority compared to other regions including Europe, Central Eurasia and the Middle East.
Rather than security and economic interests, the US has humanitarian interests in Southern Africa
including the promotion of democracy and human rights. The US interacts with the region through
dialogue forums under SADC; however, there is still no strong institutional link between Southern
African countries and the US (Frazier 2003, 277-278). The US does not interfere in regional conflicts or peacekeeping operations and limits its military exposure in the region while “SADC members largely seek U.S. diplomatic support and material resources for the goals and objectives set
by the region, rather than by Washington” (280). Relatively low engagement of the US in regional
dynamics, as compared to other parts of Africa where Washington has tried to build an “Africa
Corps” to combat terrorism, increases South Africa’s role as a key player in regional dynamics
and its role as the regional stabilizer. The US and South Africa have important bilateral relations,
especially on economic issues. Today, South Africa is the major trading partner of the United
States in the region.
Usually the main focus of regional powers is their own regional subsystem; however, some
regional powers may have overlapped memberships in other regions in which their security and
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economic interests are interdependent. Brazil and South Africa do not have such overlapped memberships in other regions while India is linked to Southeast Asia with economic and security interests. With its “Look East Policy”, which was initiated by Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao in
the early 1990s, India has engaged Southeast Asia, and since then, India has expanded its military
and economic ties with the region. The absence of any bilateral security tensions between India
and Southeast Asian countries, and potential common concerns about Chinese hegemony, have
also helped India strengthen its influence in the region. India is involved in regional affairs, especially through regional multilateral mechanisms, such as ASEAN. India became ASEAN’s official
dialogue partner in 1992 and full dialogue partner in 1995, and became member of ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996 (Pardesi, 2010). China is also present in Southeast Asia as an overlapped
member, so India to an extent balances China. Moreover, India’s economical engagement with
ASEAN has also strengthened India’s position as a key player in the region. India has sought to
gain an economic foothold and more influence in Southeast Asia. As a result, New Delhi decided
to pursue an FTA with ASEAN and signed it in 2009 (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 199).
India preferred to engage with its Southeast Asian neighbors through multilateral terms and developed its ties through regional organizations while unilateralism has dominated its foreign policy
with its South Asian neighbors in its sphere of dominance.
As mentioned in the cases under study, non-overlapped regional hegemons Brazil and
South Africa are focused on their own regions and have high concentration and attention on their
regional dynamics. On the other hand, India, as an overlapped member of Southeast Asia, is engaged in extra-regional multilateral forums not only in economic but also security-based arrangements. India has been seeking to enhance its economic and security ties through a multilateralist
foreign policy in its overlapped region and has developed stronger relations through cooperative
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mechanisms with Southeast Asian countries rather than with its South Asian neighbors. India’s
efforts to engage in extra-regional multilateral institutions and initiatives also show its aim of
global recognition rather than a regional one.
Regional Great Powers
The previous section explored and compared the behavior of regional hegemons in their
regional settings. As mentioned earlier, this study looks at material power capabilities and ideational power resources (such as willingness, ability, leadership, and provision of public goods) to
identify regional hegemons. This section of the chapter focuses on regional great powers and examines their behaviors in regional conflict and cooperation. As stated in previous chapters, countries are considered as regional great powers when they have significant hard power capabilities
relative to other countries in their regions, but because they are not the only major powers within
their regions, regional great powers are unable to dominate the region hegemonically.
With its focus on regional great powers, this section will follow the same procedure in the
selection and examination of case studies as has been done in previous section on regional
hegemons. Regional great powers are selected from multipolar regional structures by taking into
consideration alliance and overlapped membership factors. Based on the typology presented in
Chapter 2, Germany (an allied but non-overlapped case) and Iran (an un-allied and overlapped
case) are selected case studies to be examined. In this section, I will provide basic information
about hard power capabilities regional great powers and their positions in their regions. Next, I
will examine the behavior of regional great powers in terms of regional conflict and cooperation
by exploring what role selected regional great powers have played in intraregional conflict and
cooperation. Lastly, I will make a comparison between Germany and Iran in terms of their foreign
policy strategies, how they interact with the global hegemon and their interests in other regions.
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Germany in Europe
The Big Four of Europe consists of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, which
are the most powerful European countries with significant hard power capabilities. Moreover,
those countries are interconnected through economic and political institutions. Unified in 1990,
Germany has continued to be an important regional player, having Europe’s largest army (admittedly with a constitutional restriction on the use of force) and economy, and its position in the postCold War Europe can be described as a regional great power which is strong based on its hard
power capabilities but limited in ability and willingness to shape the regional dynamics alone.
Since the unification and in the immediate post-Cold War period, regional threats to Germany’s
security have also disappeared, and Germany has become partners with its old enemies in regional
integration and the promotion of regional security (Lantis 2002, 3-4). Today, Germany is able to
convert its hard power capabilities into influence over its neighbors; however, there is an important
dividing line between hegemony and influence. As also stated and described in the section on
regional hegemony case studies, hegemony requires a combination of material preponderance and
leadership among other hegemonic features including the willingness and ability to lead, playing
the role of stabilizer, and provision of public goods. Germany fulfills the latter role, but its motivation to lead has been circumscribed to a degree by its wartime past. Thus, while regional great
powers have some sort of influence in their regional spheres, they are not unrivaled in their regions
and do not possess sufficient hard power to intimidate their regional rivals to wholly dominate
their sphere of influence. With the existence of regional great powers with relatively similar hard
power capabilities, Europe can be described as a multipolar region, and in this regional structure,
Germany is an influential if not entirely predominant power. Germany, with other regional great
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powers is able to structure European security and economic systems, particularly relying on multilateral institutions to do so. Germany has been active in regional dynamics and involved in compromise and mediation activities in regional issues; ultimately Germany also to a large extent economically fuels and funds the European Union.
Germany in regional cooperation and conflict
Germany has been a key actor in European integration by being the promoter of regional
cooperation and integration. Its role alongside France in the establishment of the European Coal
and Steel Community in 1951, and its active engagement in the organization underlined Germany’s willingness to act with other countries. Germany’s NATO status was also enshrined in
1955, conditional upon US dominance. Since 1990, German unification has not led to a dramatic
change in foreign policy strategy. Germany is still a significant proponent of multilateralism and
multilateral principles with its aim to deepen and enlarge regional organizations (Baumann 2002,
14-16). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Helmut Kohl, who served as Chancellor of Germany from
1982 to 1998, continued to pursue deeper integration in Europe. In the immediate post-Cold War
period, Germany supported two integrative initiatives -the Single European Act of 1986, which
aimed to create a “Europe without frontiers”, and the Maastricht treaty of 1991, which aimed to
create a monetary union, and to a lesser extent, political integration- (Erb 2003, 111).16 These are
discussed in detail below.
With the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War, there was an important
increase in Germany’s relative and absolute power. The increase in German power led to a slow
increase in the willingness to exercise military force in multilateral combinations, and a concern
among neighboring countries that Germany was going to focus on becoming a great power and
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The Maastricht Treaty is officially known as the Treaty of European Union.
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embrace an independent foreign policy which might end its efforts for deeper European integration
(Erb 2003, 116). In contrast to these expectations, Germany showed its commitment to deeper
European integration and continued its integration efforts with its economic and foreign policy
integration initiatives. One of the most important examples for the new Germany’s continued focus
on deeper European integration was the Maastricht Treaty, which Germany signed in December
1991, along with other members of the European Community. With the ratification of the treaty in
1993, the European Community became the European Union, which was a significant step in European economic and political unity. The treaty established a new European structure which is
based on three pillars. “The first pillar was monetary union…Pillar two created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), integrating foreign policy collaboration into the institutional
framework of the EU. The third pillar is Justice and Home Affairs policy, addressed issues involving cross-national law enforcement, immigration, and other legal matters that might complicate
moves to political union” (Erb 2003, 118-119). With the second and third pillars, the aim was to
create not merely an economic but also a political union. With the ratification of the treaty, Germany did not only agree on to giving up on its monetary sovereignty but also was ready to bind its
security and foreign policy to a wider political union. However, hopes for a “Single European Act”
to follow were dashed by global economic downturns, as well as weaker economies in smaller EU
members and some states’ fear of German dominance, and the EU has fallen on harder times due
to failure to produce a single fiscal policy to accompany its common monetary policy. In addition
to challenges in the East, the reemergence of Russian assertiveness in places such as Ukraine has
presented quandaries for German policy.
Germany has participated in multilateral operations to preserve regional peace and security,
and it has advocated multilateral peace operations under the leadership of regional organizations.
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With the outbreak of wars for independence in the Balkans, Europe faced its first security crisis of
the post-Cold War period, and the civil war in European Community’s sphere of influence became
a test of whether the organization members would be able to handle the problem. The right to selfdetermination led to a violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav civil war started
when Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence from Yugoslavia. Slovenia’s declaration of independence did not have much resistance from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) which
sought to keep Yugoslavia together (Kaylvas and Sambanis 2005, 193). The Slovenian war lasted
ten days, and with the withdrawal of the Federal army from Slovenia, Slovenia declared its de
facto independence. However, Croatia had a much more intense war in which JNA put up much
more resistance than in Slovenia. The war in Croatia lasted for six months in which external actors
including the United Nations intervened in the war with its peacekeeping forces. The war in Croatia ended in 1992, with a cease-fire agreement between Croatian and Serbian negotiators. Both
Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were recognized by the European Community countries (Lantis 2002, 82-86). The arguably premature recognition of the republics of Slovenia and Croatia by European Community countries triggered the war in multi-ethnic Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1992. The Bosnian War (1992-1995) broke out between Serb-controlled JNA and
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the Bosnian referendum for independence in February, 1992 and the recognition of Bosnia by the United States and the European
countries in April. With the escalation of violence, the United Nations, NATO and the EU intervened in the war with peacekeeping activities (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005, 193).
Germany played an important role in the civilian implementation process of the Bosnian
War such as the provision of humanitarian aid and the acceptance of refugees; however, Germany
did not militarily engage in the war until 1994. In 1994, the German government decided on out-
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of-area deployments of German troops to militarily engage in the war in former Yugoslavia. Unified Germany was cautious about taking part in military missions abroad; however, with the Bosnian war, a new era began for the Bundeswehr (the unified armed forces of Germany). Germany
deployed its troops abroad for the first time and then extended beyond Europe for the first time to
a role in Afghanistan. The Bundeswehr did not act unilaterally in Bosnia; rather, it participated in
NATO-led multinational peace operations including the Implementation of Force (IFOR) which
aimed to implement peace, and later in the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which aimed to stabilize
the peace (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006, 70-74). The German engagement in peace enforcement and
later in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia showed its readiness and willingness to solve regional
crisis together with its allies.
The civil war in Bosnia created a strategic dilemma for Germany. First of all, the lasting
peace in Bosnia would be important for a secure and stable Europe. As a result, Germany felt the
need to engage in peace missions with other countries and deployed its troops abroad. Moreover,
a significant increase in Germany’s economic and military power after the unification increased
its responsibility and the expectations of its partners in terms of contributing regional crisis management and promoting regional stability (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006). The German military engagement in Bosnia increased its role in regional and international security structures and led to the
adoption of a more active foreign policy in regional crises.
Iran in the Middle East and North Africa
Based on the hard power capabilities of regional powers, the Middle East and North Africa
have a multipolar regional structure in which Iran is one of the regional great powers along with
Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Iran possesses necessary material resources in order to be recognized as a regional great power but it is not strong enough to
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shape and manage the regional order alone since it is not superior to the other actors of MENA.
Moreover, Iran has so far proved incapable of maintaining regional stability and security though
it has played a key role in containing ISIS and al Qaeda in Iraq and has extended its “axis” of
collaboration to Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. The MENA region has been characterized by political
and security instability, and in this unstable and conflict-prone neighborhood, Iran has become
embroiled in a region-wide “cold war” with Saudi Arabia for influence among Arab states and in
Islamic circles, as well as with Israel for security purposes.
As a regional great power, Tehran has sought to assert a greater influence over its neighboring countries, especially weaker ones, and to expand its relations with them. Iran has also aimed
to become a key political and economic player in the region.17 In terms of external influence, it
has sought to limit US presence and influence on regional dynamics (Bahgat, 2007, 6-7). In order
to achieve its goals, Iran has relied on coercive power including the threat to use of force, political
and economic sanctions, and interventions. The strange dynamics of the US-Iran relationship include a sanctions regime, a six-country nuclear arms control agreement, collaborative fighting for
the Iraqi regime, a basic agreement on opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan, and continuing mutual
suspicion and harassment.
MENA’s highly conflictive regional setting breeds mistrust among regional powers, and
those regional powers attempt to guarantee their security, as in the arms race. As a result, Iran also
puts greater emphasis on its military power capabilities given the unstable regional setting, the

Especially after Khomeini’s death in 1989, Iran’s revolutionary ambitions were reduced,
and its foreign policy shifted from idealistic to material foreign policy. The immediate post-revolution Iran policy prioritized its soft power and was based on the ideology of velayat-e-faqih (rule
of the jurisprudent) which aimed to unite Islam and spread this ideology to other Muslim societies.
With Khomeini’s replacement as Supreme Leader by Ali Khamenei, Iran has put greater emphasis
on a more material foreign policy, which prioritizes economic reconstruction and national interests
(Juneau and Razavi 2013).
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122
lack of regional cooperation, and poor relations with its neighbors. However, since the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, Iran’s role
and influence have been expanded significantly (Bahgat 2007, 5).
Iran in regional cooperation and conflict
In comparison to Europe and Southeast Asia, regional institutions and their effects on regional dynamics are underdeveloped in MENA, and despite lip service to the Arab League, Gulf
Cooperation Council, and Council of Islamic Cooperation, the MENA region countries do not
make much effort to develop and empower regional institutions (Beck 2014, 6). The regional security dilemma leads to mistrust and rivalry among regional powers and creates obstacles for an
effective regional integration. Beck (2014) defines the regional system of MENA as a “contracert
of power” (18). Accordingly, the relationships among regional great powers are defined by competition and use of force. As a result, those countries have failed to cooperate with each other and
to constitute a power of concert. In the MENA region, regional multipolarity seems to have bred
regional instability.
The MENA region has active regional organizations; however, today, Iran is not a member
of any regional security or economic organizations, including Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
The GCC member states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates, but Iran is excluded from this security architecture. As a non-Arab state, its problematic
relations with regional powers including armed conflicts, and political discrepancies as well as
territorial disputes have led to a lack of cooperation in its bilateral and multilateral relationships
with its neighbors. Iran’s isolation from intraregional organizations has increased its security concerns, which in turn has led to armament build up and the development of a nuclear power program.
Indeed, at different periods of time, Iran has attempted to rebuild close relations with the GCC
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countries. The relationship between Iran and the GCC dramatically improved during the presidency of Khatemi (1997-2005); however, with Ahmedinejad’s rise to power in 2005, relations
between the two cooled because of Iranian foreign policy strategies (Bahgat 2007, 11). Even during the close relations, the GCC countries had always been fearful of Iran’s potential for regional
leadership and uncomfortable with Iran’s growing influence in the region which heightened with
Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.
Iran and the MENA countries, especially the GCC countries have had different positions
on regional conflicts, and with the recent upheavals in the MENA region, such as the so-called
Arab Spring, the relationship between the two entered a new, more complex phase (Zweiri 2016,
8). Especially the political confrontation and geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia
have highly influenced regional dynamics due to their positions on current regional conflicts in
Syria and Yemen. For example, rather than working together to defuse the on-going Syrian conflict, Iran sided with the Syrian regime led by President Bashar al-Assad, and Saudi Arabia as a
very important member of the GCC backed the Syrian rebels. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have
attempted to influence the internal dynamics of their neighboring country, and their opposing
stances on Syria have led to a deepening of the conflict.
A wave of mass protests, described as the ‘Arab Spring’, began on December 18, 2010 in
Tunisia after a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire to protest the injustices of the status quo
(Ajami 2012, 56-57). Tunisian rebels adopted the political slogan of “the people want to bring
down the regime” (Abulof 2015, 672). Later, this slogan echoed across Arab lands and became
associated with the Arab Spring. Tunisian people called for the restoration of the suspended constitution and sought to throw out the authoritarian and corrupt regime (672-673). The political
unrest and mass protests spread to Egypt, Libya, and Syria among other MENA countries. While
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in some countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen the governments were overthrown,
Syria descended into a conflict in which mass protests turned into a bloody civil war with the
refusal of political transition by the Syrian government. The Syrian civil war destabilized an already conflict-prone region with on-going effects remaining, including refugee problems and terrorism (Habets 2016, 83).
The Iranian role in the Syrian civil war can be examined on the grounds of the reasons for
Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and how this involvement has affected regional dynamics. As Sadjadpour (2014) puts it, “for Tehran, the Syrian conflict is not simply about who controls
Damascus. It is the epicenter of a broader ideological, sectarian, and geopolitical struggle against
a diverse array of adversaries, including radical Sunni jihadists, Arab Gulf states, Israel, and the
United States” (1). In other words, Iranian intervention in the Syrian civil war and its military and
financial support for the Assad regime was not solely support due to an alliance between the two
but also a strategic decision in which Iran has prioritized the protection of its national interests.
Since the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, Iran and Syria have been strategic allies, and Assad’s holding
power is vital for Iran’s regional interests since Syria has been Tehran’s only consistent ally and
point of influence in the Arab world. Moreover, the United States and Israel have been the mutual
fear of Iran and Syria, which also sustains the strategic alliance between two (Sadjadpour, 2014).
Due to these facts, Iran became involved in the Syrian civil war to prevent its strategic partner
from collapsing and to ensure the Assad regime’s continuation of power. As Hokayem (2014) puts
it, “for Iran, the fall of the Assad regime would have amounted to a strategic setback and a limitation of its Levantine reach” (71). Moreover, the geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia
and their regional ambitions have also led to the involvement of both countries in the civil war,
which has significantly influenced Syrian internal dynamics. Overall, Iran’s military and financial
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assistance for the Assad regime and the GCC states’ support for the fragmented rebellion have
affected the duration of the civil war, and the involvement of external players in the Syrian conflict
with different interests have been an obstacle for a political solution in Syria (Hokayem 2014, 4042).
A Comparison of Regional Great Powers: Germany and Iran
Germany and Iran are the selected regional great power cases in this study based on their
relative hard power capabilities within their regional settings. These cases show the important differences in terms of their regional settings which in turn affect their foreign policy strategies in
regional conflict and cooperation. As mentioned earlier, case studies are selected based on their
alliance with the global hegemon and their membership in another region. Germany is an allied
and non-overlapped regional great power while Iran is an un-allied and overlapped regional great
power. At the end of this section, alliance and overlapped membership factors will be taken into
consideration to better understand how these features of regional great powers affect their behaviors in their own regions and nearby regions.
The regional strategic settings of Germany and Iran are significantly different and have
effects on the engagement of regional great powers in regional cooperative initiatives and conflict
resolution. Regional settings have also shaped regional great powers’ foreign policy strategies and
their relations with neighboring countries.
Germany has the advantages of being a member of a relatively stable, economically developed and peaceful region. Based on the report released in 2016 by the Global Peace Index, the
world’s most peaceful region is Europe while the least peaceful region is MENA. Stability and
security in Europe has led to a high level of trust among neighboring countries, which in turn has
led to the engagement of regional powers in regional organizations. In such a peaceful regional
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setting, Germany has been the proponent of multilateral action as well as the collective partner of
both regional great powers and the global hegemon. Moreover, the Federal of Germany has had
the reputation of having an aggressive nature, and unified Germany has been aware of its neighbors’ concerns about its aggressive acts during the Cold War. Hence unified Germany has sought
to reassure its neighbors that it does not have assertive intentions. Germany has aimed to ease the
concerns of its neighbors by supporting integration as well as being a proponent of antimilitarism
and the use of force only as a last resort to protect its partners and promote regional security.
Germany has avoided unilateralist foreign policy strategies and acted together with its neighbors,
mainly through multilateral forums (Sakaki 2011, 3-4). Today, multilateralism, limitation in using
military force and intra-regional trade are central elements of German foreign policy.
On the other hand, the MENA region is one of the most conflict-prone regions in which
the number of regional and intra-state crises are high while the number of cooperative initiatives
are very low. In recent years, the MENA region has mostly experienced intra-state conflicts. However, intra-state conflict and violence in MENA have spillover effects which lead to regional instability. The region’s conflict-prone structure has led to the weakness in trust among neighboring
countries. Today, there are various intraregional organizations in MENA; however, those organizations mainly consist of Gulf region countries and do not encompass other regional countries.
Moreover, the existing regional organizations are relatively ineffective in promoting stability and
security. There has been no significant effort for the formation or development of regional cooperation to promote regional stability. Iran is not a member of any intraregional organizations, and
its problematic relations with many of its neighbors is an obstacle for regional cooperative initiatives. Moreover, the lack of inclusive multilateral regional security forums on regional challenges
is also an important obstacle for Iran’s regional integration.
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Both Germany and Iran interfered in regional crises; however, their role and strategies in
those crises show important differences. Germany participated in the Bosnia mission of regional
and international organizations by contributing troops to the NATO operations and played an active role in peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities. On the other hand, Iran intervened in
a domestic struggle for power and positioned itself with the Assad regime and thereby Russia in
Syria, but fought alongside US-led forces in Iraq against ISIS. Gulf states including Saudi Arabia
and Qatar also were involved in Syria, supporting opposition groups, and took sides in Iraq,
Yemen, and elsewhere as well. The lack of cooperative actions among external players to find a
peaceful solution for the Syrian civil war and their positioning and behaviors towards the conflicting parties in Syria intensified the war. Iran has prioritized its national interests over regional security and stability.
In its relations with neighboring countries, Germany, which certainly also promotes its
interests even as it builds multilateral institutions, has been using nonmaterial means of power
including ideas, persuasion, deference, and consensus. Germany has sought to solve regional disputes and conflicts through diplomatic and economic channels. Iran, on the other hand, has been
relying mainly on the projection of hard power (usually military action). With its assertive foreign
policy strategies, Iran has been a coercive power in MENA. In contrast to Germany, Iran adopted
unilateralist foreign policy strategies and employed hard power tools to deal with regional threats
and security challenges.
Alliance factors and external influence in regional dynamics have shaped regional politics
in both Europe and MENA. Germany has enjoyed a strong relationship with the US which Germany sees as vital in fostering peace and stability in the region. For Germany, the US has been a
very important actor in European security dynamics since it has been “the ultimate guarantor of
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security in Europe” (Sasaki 2011, 62). The Bosnian crisis is a good example of US-Europe cooperation in tackling security challenges in the region (Dorff 1998, 62). Rather than excluding the
external player from regional dynamics, Germany has engaged the US in dealing with threats and
challenges those Europe has been facing.
Regional great powers of the MENA region have also had strong relations with the US,
and Iran followed that pattern until 1979. During the Cold War, the US sought to have good relations with regional great powers in MENA. However, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 ruptured USIranian relations (Beck 2014, 9). Today, Iran is no longer allied with the US but the American role
in MENA is important to understand regional politics. The US has been the leading external actor
in Middle Eastern regional security dynamics. The MENA region does not have a regional
hegemon, so it is more prone to global penetration than regions with regional hegemons, although
penetrating outsiders are often engulfed in the pressures and priorities of their regional clients,
such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. In this region, there is no regional hegemon to provide public
goods, and the US has inserted itself in regional dynamics by claiming to deliver public goods,
such as peace, democracy and security. As during the Cold War period, the US has an important
amount of military presence and often takes military steps in dealing with regional crises (Bowman
2008, 81), although Washington’s reputation for “even-handedness” has been eroded by an ever
growing alignment with Israel.
Iran has always claimed that the US is one of the most important reasons behind the regional instability and has sought to defy US influence in the region. Hence, Iran has called for a
regional security arrangement to consist of only regional states and exclude extra regional powers.
However, Iran’s rising power has been an important concern for its neighbors, and to prevent Iran’s
domination in the region, the MENA countries refused such security system proposals (Bahgat
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2007, 6). As stated above, Iran does not have a formal alliance with the US. Its interactions with
the global hegemon have been among the greatest challenges in its foreign policy as Iran and the
US have had bitter relations since 1979. There have been attempts from both sides to reduce tensions at different periods of time. For example, Iranian President Khatami called for a dialogue of
civilizations rather than a clash of civilizations; however, the initiative did not work. Similarly, in
2009, Obama made speeches relating to a dialogue between Iran and the US, which was rejected
by the Iranian regime (Davies, 2013). Some developments in Iran’s national security strategy have
also worsened the relationship between these two countries. For example, Iranian development of
nuclear weapons technology has been one of the greatest concerns of the global hegemon. Even
though Iran claims that it develops its nuclear capabilities for only domestic purposes, the US has
difficulties in reaching a clear understanding of the motivations for the program (Bradley, 2008).
Further, its other regional clients, Israel and Saudi Arabia influence US approaches on these and
other questions related to Tehran.
As mentioned previously, some regional hegemons/great powers may have interests in
more than one region in which their security is also interdependent. While Germany is a nonoverlapped case and does not have such security interdependence with other regions, Iran is an
overlapped member of Central Eurasia. As Eyvazov (2009) has stated “geography, history, and
ethnic and confessional affiliation tie Iran to Central Eurasia” (19). Central Eurasia is important
for Iran’s security policies. One of the reasons of the close security interdependence of Iran with
states in Central Eurasia is Iran’s having a sea border with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
and Russia: the Caspian Sea. The strategic importance of the sea lies in the fact that it contains
large volumes of oil and natural gas reserves, which also leads to political and economic problems
among the five bordering states mentioned above on how to divide the energy resources (20).
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Throughout its history, the Soviet Union has been a threat to Iran’s national security due to the
expansionist policies of the former (Tarock 1997, 207). With the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
the relationship between Russia as the current regional hegemon of Central Eurasia and Iran as
Central Eurasia’s overlapped member has been somewhat more cooperative if not fully trusting.
Since the end of the Cold War, the two countries have been interacting in a cooperative manner
and developing strategic coordination to reach their mutual interests in Central Eurasia, such as
common security concerns and economic interests in the Caspian Sea (207-208).
Iran has been involved in Central Eurasian disputes including the 1988 Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the civil war in Tajikistan in 1994. Iran has been
cooperating with Russia on the solution of regional crises, which both Iran and Russia have treated
as a threat to their national security and regional influence. For example, Iran has been involved
in the Tajikistan conflict with Russia for a peaceful settlement and has mediated between Tajikistan’s President Rakhmonov, and Nuri, the leader of Tajikistan’s Islamic movement. The RussianIranian cooperation efforts to settle the Tajik conflict resulted with a peace agreement in 1995
which was signed by the parties to the Tajik conflict, and it ended the dispute politically rather
than militarily (Olimov 2016, 49). Iran’s successful mediation efforts are welcomed by Central
Eurasian countries since Iran has provided a negotiated settlement with Russia for a regional stability threat. Iran has been also interacting with other Central Eurasian countries in a more cooperative manner: these interactions have been limited to bilateral relations, but cooperation among
these countries has not led to any multilateral regional arrangements. Iran’s role in its overlapped
region can be defined as a cooperative and stabilizing.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, selected case studies were examined. The first section of this chapter covered regional hegemons: Brazil, South Africa, and India while the second part analyzed regional
great powers: Germany and Iran. Each case study involved examination of the position of the case
in the regional hierarchy and its behaviors in regional conflict and cooperation. Behaviors of regional hegemons and regional great powers were examined and analyzed separately with a focus
on their foreign policy strategies in regional conflict and cooperation. In the last part of each section, the characteristics of regions, alignment with the global hegemon and overlapped membership were analyzed and compared. The brief assessment of case studies on regional hegemons
showed that the key factors explaining variations in their behaviors are geopolitical conditions,
material conditions of regional hegemons, and whether they are involved in another region. The
brief assessment of case studies on regional great powers showed that geopolitical conditions and
their involvement in another region are also key factors in understanding variations in behaviors
and strategies of regional great powers. The next chapter is the concluding chapter of the study,
which will present summary of the study and findings. It will also provide a detailed discussion on
the similarities and differences between the strategies and behaviors of global and regional
hegemons as an attempt to answer the overarching question of the study: are there similarities in
behaviors and motivations of regional hegemons and global hegemon(s) in comparable situations,
such as conflict and cooperation? The next chapter will conclude with suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 6-CONCLUSION
Summary of the Study
In applying HST to the regional level in this study, I examined the relationship between
the distribution of power and regional outcomes (conflict and cooperation) by developing regionallevel propositions. Building on Lemke’s (2010) study in which he also develops regional-level
propositions but does not explain much about regional powers’ behaviors in regional cooperation
and crisis or conflict situations, the purpose of my study was to analyze regions comprehensively
by examining the behaviors and strategies of various types of regional hegemons/great powers
within their respective regions and conditions which affect their strategies and behaviors. In addition to the comparison of regional hegemons/great powers to one another, this study aimed to
explore the similarities and differences between the behaviors and strategies of regional and global
hegemons.
This study consisted of three parts. The first part of the study identified regional powers
and classified countries as regional hegemons, regional great powers, regional powers, and limited
regional powers based on their hard power capabilities- military, economic and demographic- and
calculated their relative strength in given regions from 1990 to 2013. In addition to hard power
capabilities, this study adopted three dimensions of power proposed by Miriam Prys (2008) to
determine regional hegemons: perception, projection, and provision (chapter 3). The second part
dealt with a regional-level application of HST and tested regional-level HST propositions by analyzing analysis of aggregate data (chapter 4). The final part examined selected case studies and
aimed to provide comprehensive answers to the set of questions proposed in chapter 2 (chapter 5).
The methodology adopted by this study is a combination of the aggregate data analysis and
the method of structured and focused case comparison proposed by George and Bennett (2005).
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With the analysis of aggregate data, regional-level propositions which were mainly built on HST
were tested and presented. With the case study method, this study aimed to offer an in-depth analysis of the behaviors and strategies of different types of regional hegemons/great powers in comparable situations.
Summary of Findings
The Aggregate Data Analysis
By applying system-level HST propositions to the region level, the findings of the aggregate data analysis show that region-level HST propositions were supported in terms of the relationship between the existence of a regional hegemon and regional outcome (cooperation and conflict). The aggregate data analysis on regional cooperation shows that regions with a regional
hegemon/great power experienced the highest number of intraregional organizations while regions
without a regional hegemon/great powers have the fewest number of intraregional organizations.
Moreover, regions with a regional hegemon/great power had a lower number of intraregional conflicts than regions without a regional hegemon/great power. These region-level findings on the
relationship between the existence of a regional hegemon and regional outcome are compatible
with system-level HST. Moreover, in contrast to general expectations on multipolar regions, I
found that multipolar regions did not show significant differences from unipolar regions with a
regional hegemon in terms of the number of intraregional MIDs and IGOs they had.
Different from Lemke’s study, this study tested for the impact of the alliance between the
global hegemon and regional hegemons/great powers on regional cooperation and conflict. Building on Ikenberry’s (2004) argument on the American alliance system and its effects on conflict
and cooperation, I expected to see a low number of intraregional MIDs and a high number of
intraregional conflict in regions where external alliances exist. To some extent, my findings are at
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odds with Ikenberry (2004). As opposed to what was expected, the findings suggest that regional
cooperation is low in unipolar and multipolar regions where an external alliance exists. On the
other hand, as expected, the results showed a low number of intraregional conflicts in such regions.
Lastly, the study added another independent variable to previous studies by testing the relationship
between overlapped memberships and regional outcomes. Based on the results, overlapped regions
have more intraregional organizations and fewer intraregional MIDs. These findings are consistent
with my propositions and expectations.
The aggregate data analysis was the evaluation of the raw statistics to test my propositions.
Moreover, this method enabled me to test whether HST is applicable to the regional level and
provided general answers for what intraregional dynamics work. As stated earlier, this research
was intended to expand Lemke’s (2010) study beyond testing HST and find potentially useful
answers to a set of questions to understand the motivations, strategies and behaviors of regional
hegemons/great powers in their regional settings. At this point, the case study section enabled me
to do a comprehensive research on the strategies as well as the behaviors of regional
hegemons/great powers and factors which affect their choices.
The Cases: Brazil, South Africa, and India as Regional Hegemons
The existing literature on regional powers, except a few works that focus on regional power
strategies and behaviors, are primarily single-case studies and do not offer a comprehensive and
comparative examination of regional power behavior. In contrast, my study focused on three different types of regional hegemons and compared their behaviors to one another by asking a similar
set of questions in each case. Moreover, the assessment of Brazil, South Africa, and India enabled
me to draw some conclusions regarding similarities and differences among these three different
types of regional hegemons and address limitations in such a comparative study.
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Based on the findings in Chapter 5, regional conditions and the material capabilities of
regional hegemons affected their strategy choices, behaviors and dominance patterns. On the other
hand, while the overlapped membership factor affected the behaviors of regional hegemons, the
alliance factor does not seem to have a significant effect on their behaviors and choices.
As I demonstrated in my cases on Brazil and South Africa, cooperative hegemony as a
foreign policy strategy has been adopted by these two different types of regional hegemons. Foreign policy strategies adopted by both regional hegemons show relatively a high degree of institutionalization, and these regional hegemons wield influence over regional institutions which serve
as power bases for them. The relatively peaceful regional settings of South America and Southern
Africa have enabled regional hegemons to advance regional order through new or existent security
and economic regional organizations, which has way to cooperative unipolarity. Moreover, based
on CINC score of Brazil, which was presented in Chapter 3, Brazil’s share of regional hard power
is 51 percent and South Africa’s share of regional hard power is 42 percent. While Brazil and
South Africa are the regional hegemons of their respective regions, there are secondary regional
powers in their spheres of influence which have significant impacts on the regional dynamics. Both
regional hegemons have been relatively successful in converting their hard power capabilities to
actual influence; however, it is important to note that they have not been free of obstacles in their
exercise of power. Both Brazil’s and South Africa’s shares of power in their regional settings are
relatively lower than India’s share of power in South Asia. As a result, both Brazil and South
Africa have not been able to exercise their power in unilateral terms and thus have adopted a multilateral strategy.18 While there are similarities in their regional conditions and hard power share
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Furthermore, Brazil may run into some soft power limitations due to its constraining
culture (Portuguese) in relation to its Spanish speaking neighbors.
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within their respective regions, Brazil is also an allied but non-overlapped regional hegemon while
South Africa is an un-allied and non-overlapped regional hegemon, though it does wield some
influence throughout African continent, as seen for example in its participation in Liberian peace
talks in the late 1990s. However, though Brazil has a major power regional ally (the US), it often
works to offset allied dominance, as the alliance factor does not seem to affect the behaviors of
these regional hegemons. Indeed, both regional hegemons have sought to limit global penetration
and influence in regional dynamics through the formation of regional organizations.
India, on the other hand, has followed a unilateral hegemonic strategy with its low degree
of institutionalization and its choice of the exercise of power through unilateral and bilateral
means. The relatively unstable regional setting of South Asia and the existence of a challenger to
India’s security have led New Delhi to adopt a unilateralist strategy on many occasions and show
less interest in regional cooperation. Moreover, unlike Brazil and South Africa, the power gap
between India and its most powerful neighbor/rival, Pakistan, is considerably high. Based on CINC
score, India’s share of regional hard power capability is 75 percent, and it has been able to achieve
its goals through unilateral terms; hence, it did not bind its sovereignty or decision-making to
regional organizations, specifically on security issues. India is an un-allied but also an overlapped
regional hegemon. While again alliance does not play a major role here, the overlapped membership factor affects India’s strategies and choices in its own region and its overlapped region. India
is an overlapped member of the Southeast Asian region and increasingly involved in Southeast
Asian affairs though multilateral organizations.
While regional environments and power disparities go a long way to explain the varied regional
hegemonic behavior I have noted, it is also possible that idiosyncratic leadership factors, i.e.,
agency, also plays a role. If Brazil’s center leftist regimes of recent years give way, as the recent
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presidential impeachment might indicate, the degree of its regional multilateralism could diminish.
If a shift away from the ANC in South Africa occurs, a similar change in foreign policy orientation
might also occur. As we know from other contexts, including the global, however, there is always
a tendency for foreign policy “culture” to persist from leader to leader because of geo-politics,
power levels, and persistent national interests.
As noted below comparison of global hegemonic behaviors and post-Cold War regional
hegemonic behaviors show similarities, but especially so for India. Among all three cases, India’s
behaviors show more similarities with global hegemonic strategies than the other two due to the
facts of India’s regional setting and relative hard power capability. Yet global hegemons have
tended also to promote multilateral institutions and systemic norm building as well.
The Cases: Germany and Iran as Regional Great Powers
Through the cases of Germany and Iran, I examined the regional foreign policy strategies
of two different types of regional great powers. The case analysis of these regional great powers,
which operate under two different regional settings enabled me to explore their foreign policy
strategies, behaviors and motivations. Consistent with the findings which were presented in the
section on regional hegemons, the strategic choices and behaviors of regional great powers are
highly influenced by their geo-political conditions and overlapped memberships. Again, while the
alliance factor influences the behaviors of regional great powers, these states’ material capabilities
do not have a preponderant impact on their foreign policy choices since they operate under multipolar regional structures in which there are more than great two powers with relatively the same
share of hard power capabilities.
As a member of a relatively peaceful and stable region, Germany has enjoyed the advantages of cooperation, and in building trust following a disastrous war experience it has followed
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a multilateralist foreign policy strategy. In contrast, as a member of relatively conflictive and unstable region, Iran did not join intraregional organizations but instead followed a unilateral and
bilateral route. The alliance factor plays a significant role in both regional dynamics. For Germany,
its alliance with US is crucial for regional security and stability. Germany has sought to engage
the US in regional dynamics and has collaborated with the US to address regional threats and
challenges. On the other hand, Iran does not have a formal alliance with the US and has sought to
exclude it from regional dynamics. Iran is an overlapped member of Central Eurasia which has a
great importance for Iran’s security policies as well as its role in mediating regional crises with
Russian cooperation.
A Discussion on the Global and Regional Hegemonic Strategies
In order to answer the overarching question of this dissertation, this section will briefly
review global hegemonic strategies and discuss the similarities and differences between global and
regional hegemonic strategies and behaviors.
As reviewed in the first chapter of this study, scholars have offered various global and
regional hegemonic strategies which have been adopted by global and regional hegemons to exert
their influence over other countries. Based on the literature, global and regional hegemons may
assert control over other states through coercive or benevolent leadership by adopting unilateral or
multilateral strategies including trade, military or economic alliances, and international/intraregional institutions. Even though regional hegemons operate under an international hierarchy, and
external interference in regional dynamics is always possible, still there are some similarities between global and regional hegemonic strategies. At this point, it is useful to briefly assess British,
Soviet and US hegemonies to draw some conclusions about similarities and differences between
global and regional hegemonic strategies.
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Studies of British hegemony have mainly focused on international political economy and
how British hegemony has imposed order on the international economic system. According to
Kindleberger (1973), during its era of global hegemony in the nineteenth century, Britain followed
an international economic openness strategy based on the policy of free trade in which Germany,
the US and France joined. In order to exert influence over other countries and alter their actions
and policies, Britain used its trade dominance and international market power as a strategy of trade
policy. Britain assumed responsibility for the regulation and management of the international economic infrastructure and provided public good by carrying the entire burden. During its hegemonic
period, Britain was able to provide a secure and stable international political order in which international economic activities took place.
Moreover, Britain created institutions which constrained its freedom of action but at the same time
served its interests. Britain’s institutional strategies led to the creation of the Concert of Europe,
and the League of Nation (Ikenberry 2001a, 41; Nye 2002, 554). Telo (2016) highlights the weakness of British multilateralism by proposing domestic and international reasons for it. Accordingly,
the relationship between the imperial tradition of Britain and its rising multilateralism reflects a
domestic ideological contradiction. Moreover, he argues, the Concert system under British hegemony also had limits in maintaining international multilateral stability since “it could prevent neither
the economic conflicts nor the violent blunders of European imperialism, nor the two World Wars”
(24).
With the creation of the new polarity after World War II, the world’s two superpowers, the
US and the Soviet Union, became the major players in world politics. The presence of the Soviet
threat, which was militarily equal but economically far behind, shaped US behavior and highly
affected its foreign policy strategies. During the Cold War, like Britain, the US dominated the
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international economic system and played a leading role in international economic liberalization;
however, their bases of economic hegemony differed greatly. Lake (1991) compares nineteenth
century British hegemonic strategies to Cold-War American hegemonic strategies. Accordingly,
while the US, he argues, has never controlled international trade to the same extent as Britain, but
Britain has never had as large a share of world product as the US. As a result, Britain used its
dominance of international trade while the US relied on its relatively greater domestic market
power and used inducements and threats to influence choices and actions of foreign governments.
(111-112). Lake (1991) also emphasizes free trade order built under British and American hegemonies by mentioning how military and security issues have been linked with trade treaties. Accordingly, British leadership constructed a free trade order by including colonies, allies and antagonists
and arguably benefiting all participants. Due perhaps to over-stretching in the long term, this system undermined the strength of the United Kingdom. With American hegemony, on the other hand,
major US trading partners were also its allies, and in this order, American allies were the main
recipients of the benefits derived from the specialization and the international division of labor.
Thus, the US was fortifying its security needs and preventing its challengers from emerging (115116).
During the Cold War, American hegemony had a highly-institutionalized character, and
multilateralism became an important feature of American foreign policy to solve international issues and promote peace and stability in the world (Clark 2011, 124). The security concerns of the
US during the Cold War led the US to adopt cooperative strategies with its European allies to
overcome the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Despite differences and disagreements among
European countries and the US, the existence of a common challenge to their security facilitated
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cooperation among countries (Lieber 1997). During this period, US policymakers encouraged international security arrangements, such as UN and NATO, and facilitated multilateral economic
institutions. According to Skidmore (2011) the US provided public goods through multilateral
institutions while enjoying privileges, such as relative freedom of action compared with other
states. Since the end of World War II, the US has dominated its alliances and coalitions militarily
which coalition participants have come to accept.
In this bipolar international structure, the US has exercised both coercive power including
the use of force, threat and sanction, and benevolent power including rewarding, convincing, and
co-opting in order to influence choices of foreign countries. The US responded to the Soviet-Communist threat and international instability by military means including intervening or supporting
military interventions in the regions, such as MENA and Latin America as well as fighting wars
in Korea (1950-1953) and Vietnam (1965-1973) to prevent the expansion of communism. Even
though UN forces have played a minimal role in world events, and UN peacekeeping operations
were not chosen to deal with intra-state conflicts and international crises during the Cold War due
to the rivalry between Eastern and Western blocs which made the Security Council unable to decide on a common policy, still the US has supported UN peacekeeping operations financially and
militarily (Kertcher 2012, 612-613).
Strategies of the Soviet Union and the US have not shown much differences in their struggle for global influence. Soviet hegemony also aimed to contain its rival without a war and isolate
its Eastern alliances from Western influence (Jesse et al. 2012, 34-35). To do so, like the US, the
Soviet Union used international institutions to assert control over other countries within its respective camp. Jesse et al. (2012) argue that Moscow used two main institutions to sustain its hegemony
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over Eastern European countries: (1) militarily, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO, or Warsaw Pact) which was a military alliance bloc; and (2) the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(Comecon, or CMEA) which was an economic organization of the bloc (35). The Warsaw Pact
was an international collective defense pact; however, it was dominated and used by the Soviet
Union primarily for its political objectives. As Kramer (1984-1985) puts it:
The Warsaw Pact provided the Soviet Union with a valuable means of containing the ‘renationalization’ of the East European armed forces which began to accelerate after 1956;
the symbolic concession to East European national feelings embodies in the Pact’s formation helped to preclude the eruption of nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiments in most of
the East European countries. (as quoted in Jesse et al. 2012, 35-36)
Like the US, the Soviet Union intervened in the internal politics of other countries and stepped
into Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as Afghanistan as an attempt to expand its political military influence or deny the opponent influence throughout the world as well as in its local regional
sphere of influence (Gibbs, 1987).
The collapse of the Soviet bloc at the beginning of the 1990s brought about a new international order, and the US emerged as the sole power in the unipolar international system structure.
With the end of the Cold War, which removed an external threat to US security, the US became
much freer in its foreign policy strategies. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the US kept
following its institution-building agenda under both Bush and Clinton administrations. The US
defined its foreign policy as one of multilateralism but also had the freedom to use coercive power
to preserve its interests when necessary as was the case in the Persian Gulf War (January 15February 28, 1991).19 Following the end of the Cold War, the US built and expanded regional and
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In 1991, US-led coalition of states staged a military intervention against Iraq as a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. With this military intervention, the US sought to protect its
global interests since MENA is strategically and economically important for the US. In decisionmaking process, President Bush relied on Security Council Resolution 678 “which authorized using all necessary means to evict Iraq from Kuwait” (Quigley 1992, 1).
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global institutions across security and economic areas including institutions such as the expansion
of NATO along with the creation of NAFTA and WTO (Ikenberry 2001a, 233). The US worked
with multilateral institutions to resolve disputes in Somalia and joined the Bosnia peacekeeping
mission in the 1990s (Corbetta and Dixon 2004, 5).
Unilateralism has also been used as a foreign policy strategy by American policymakers. Since the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the US has favored a more unilateral form of hegemony
in dealing with security issues. Unilaterally pursued US foreign policies such as the rejection of
the Kyoto Protocol, the rejection to participate in the International Criminal Courts and the invasion of Iraq without the UN authorization revealed the US tendency on unilateral approach (Flemes
2010, 96). Moreover, the 9/11 attacks led the US to engage in military, political and cultural operations all over the world without territorial or temporal limits (Suri 2009, 627). Ikenberry (2001a)
argues that the Bush administration’s willingness to act alone following 9/11 and unwillingness to
accept institutional constraints in the war on terrorism was a ‘strategic wrong turn’ and as he puts
it “[it] has done so much damage to the country’s international position- its prestige, credibility,
security partnerships and goodwill of other countries-“ (7). Like Ikenberry, Nye (2002) also argues
that the US should act multilaterally during the current period in which it faces security threats and
foreign policy issues such as terrorism, world trade, the environment and cultural extremism. According to Nye, the US can use multilateral approaches such as alliances, coalitions, transitional
organizations and regional security organizations; however, Washington should not rule out unilateral action in all situations and should occasionally use a unilateral approach in situations in
which multilateral arrangements are not good for US interests.
Indeed, US foreign policy strategies were more definite under the presence of an external
threat during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, US presidents used a combination of
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different strategies in their foreign policy choices, and as He (2010) puts it “no one theory or
strategy can fully explain the US policy under unipolarity after the Cold War” (1126). Hemmer
and Katzenstein (2002) argue that US policymakers use a multilateral approach when norms and
a shared sense of culture are similar while they favor bilateralism in the absence of norms and
shared culture (598). They refer to the United States’ favoring multilateralism in Europe in terms
of NATO and bilateralism in Asia in terms of SEATO. They argue that since the US and Europe
have a strong sense of collective identity, U.S policymakers have favored multilateralism in this
region to achieve their goals while they have favored bilateralism in East Asia because “US policymakers saw their potential Asian allies … as part of an alien, and in important ways, inferior
community” (575). According to them, the US uses mainly bilateral diplomacy, in which two states
interact with each other directly, because multilateral diplomacy is very difficult to accomplish
since it requires a strong sense of collective identity among states. Ikenberry, in his Liberalism and
Empire (2004), also argues that the US prefers to operate within bilateral frameworks with countries which cooperate with the US and accept its leadership. These countries, in turn, receive special bilateral security and economic favors. The US prefers to build bilateral security relations in
places where it is dominant and does not need to give up its policy autonomy as was the case in
East Asia (628). One of the most recent examples can be the Obama administration’s adoption of
a multilateral approach and engagement in multilateral negotiations to bring Iran to the negotiation
table (Hastedt 2015, 282). The US worked with a diverse group of states to restraint Iran’s pursuit
of a nuclear weapon program. Faced with powerful economic sanctions, Iran agreed on restrictions
on its nuclear program and intensive inspections in an agreement signed with world powers in July
2015. Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken claimed that
without our partners, we could never have built or maintained a sanctions regime powerful
enough to help Iran to the negotiating table or knitted together an understanding strong
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enough to verifiably and comprehensively ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is, and will
remain, exclusively for peaceful purposes. (CFR Events)
Given all the arguments and examples above, it can be concluded that its position in the
international hierarchy gives freedom to the US to maneuver freely in its foreign policy strategies.
Even though the international system was demarcated into distinct blocs and none of the
cases under study have such regional systems, the global strategic setting of the Cold War and the
current South Asian regional setting still show some similarities in terms of having two powerful
countries with nuclear capabilities and their limits to respond each other’s threats due to the fear
of nuclear escalation. The existence of a threat shapes state behaviors and constrains foreign policy
choices as demonstrated in US-Soviet relations during the Cold War period. As previously mentioned, India also faces a threat in its unipolar regional structure which limits its actions, choices
and responses to Pakistan. Regardless of unequal hard power capabilities of India and Pakistan
(and the rest of the region), today Pakistan is India’s principal rival in the region. The US response
to Soviet threat was a policy of containment which aimed at preventing the spread of communism
and Soviet influence by military intervention or support as well as the development of multilateral
security organizations. In comparison, India has responded to Pakistani threat by bilateral security
initiatives and external connections. Moreover, like the international system during the Cold War
period, the current existence of a rivalry in the South Asian regional system leads to instability of
the regional order. During the Cold War, the US was able to form institutions and exercise its
power through those organizations. India, on the other hand, has preferred to exercise its power
without reliance on such regional organizations which are already underdeveloped due to the insecure political environment of the region. India has neither promoted the formation of security
organizations nor actively engaged in the existing ones. It has been interacting with its neighbors,
for better or worse, through bilateral security and economic initiatives.
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As mentioned in the cases under study, both Brazil and South Africa have followed a multilateral route in their relations with neighboring countries. On the other hand, while India has
preferred a unilateral route in its foreign policy related to security issues in South Asia, it has
exercised multilateralism outside the region in UN peacekeeping missions and in Non-aligned
Movement. At this point, it is important to note that both Brazil and South Africa lack the capabilities to achieve their goals unilaterally. In their spheres of influence, both countries need the
support of their neighbors to achieve their foreign policy goals since countries within their own
regions have a relatively more significant level of influence on regional dynamics. Hence, Brazil
and South Africa have used their resources to sustain and enforce regional institutions which led
to effectiveness of those regional organizations. On the other hand, with its relatively high material
capabilities, India is a natural hegemon in its region, and most of the other countries, except Pakistan, lack the capability to influence regional dynamics. As a powerful regional hegemon, India
has the advantage to choose from different foreign policy strategies. As the case with the postCold War US, the power disparity between India and the rest of the region makes unilateral options
available for India and reduces incentives to act multilaterally. As a result, India usually considers
unilateralism as a viable route to make foreign policy decisions and does not prefer to constrain its
power in multilateral forums or bind its decision-making to intraregional organizations. India only
chooses to work through multilateral forums when the benefits of acting in coalition outweigh the
costs of going it alone.
Analyzing individual level of foreign policy decision making can also highlight the similarities and differences between global and regional hegemonic strategies and how heads of state
or government orient their foreign policy behaviors. At both the global and regional levels, among
various factors including system level (polarity, polarization, geopolitics), domestic level (military
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and economic capabilities, government type), and organizational level (bureaucratic politics), leaders’ personalities and perspectives may also affect foreign policy behavior and tendencies.20 Shift
in US foreign policy strategies under different presidents can be given as an example for how
presidents’ personal characteristics impact their foreign policy orientations. As mentioned above,
US hegemonic strategies showed basic continuity under George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George
Bush, and Barack Obama in the main strands of US foreign policy, and during their presidential
terms, the US followed a basically multilateral liberalist doctrine in its relations with other countries, though with occasional unilateral moves as well. George W. Bush’s extreme American exceptionalism, which posited that the US was strong enough to set the rules and acted alone, his
self-perceived strength and his belief in American freedom of action are important individual level
factors which played roles in the move towards unilateralist decisions, as in the Iraq invasion,
albeit with some allied cooperation.
Even more stridently, Donald Trump signals a shift from his immediate predecessor
Obama’s focus on multilateralism. During the presidential campaign and in his inaugural address,
Trump emphasized his unilateral “America First”, tendencies. During the campaign, Trump also
challenged institutionalism by defining NATO as “obsolete” and giving speeches favoring dissolution of the European Union. After taking office, Trump’s decisions have manifested that his
campaign rhetoric translated into action, especially in unilateral action on airstrikes in Syria and
speeches on actions to eliminate the nuclear threat from North Korea ‘with or without China’. In
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The individual level of foreign policy decision making assumes that the personal characteristics of political leaders affect their governments’ foreign policy behavior. Four personal
characteristics, which include beliefs (e.g., nationalism, belief in one’s own ability to control
events), motives (e.g., the need for power, affiliation, approval), decision style (e.g., openness to
new information, preference for certain level of risk) and, interpersonal style (e.g., excessive suspiciousness, manipulative behavior) are considered as the factors which have the most impact on
a government’s foreign policy behavior in individual level (Hermann 1980, 8-10).
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the US case, hegemonism exists in power terms; however, foreign policy orientations have shown
differences with respect to multilateral and unilateral tendencies, even as Russia reemerged as a
power to be taken seriously in MENA, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.
Today, the unexpected leadership in Brazil brings about the question of whether such a
direction change can also occur, for example in Brazilian foreign policy. As mentioned under the
case study section, Brazil has been using a multilateral means of foreign policy to achieve its regional projection of power. Beginning with the 1990s, multilateralism has been keeping its central
in Brazilian foreign policy and has shown more or less continuity under Lula (2003-2011) and his
immediate successor, Rousseff (2011-2016). As Vice President of Brazil under Rousseff, Michel
Temer took office after Rousseff’s impeachment and removal in 2016. Temer’s foreign policy
goals, at least in the early going, have emphasized the need for a change in Brazilian policy and
have reflected some tendency toward bilateralism with a focus on free trade agreements and prioritizing economic relations with the US and European Union. After almost a year of the new
government, Brazil has scaled down its regional integration and signaled its intentions towards
international partnerships. Especially the diplomatic isolation of Venezuela and its suspension
from Mercosur in December, 2016 foreshadow damage to Brazil’s regional integration efforts under previous governments. Based on speeches which emphasize a strategic change under Temer’s
presidency and actions which take a bilateral route, there is a reason to believe that Brazil may
shift its foreign policy strategy. Under previous governments, Brazil chose to act multilaterally to
assert its influence over its neighbors and to avoid the concerns of neighboring countries regarding
Brazil’s hegemonic aspirations. Even though it still remains to be seen if Brazil will be able to
change its direction as freely as the global hegemon, Brazil’s orienting itself unilaterally in the
regional context would lead to an increased concern among its neighbors with regard to Brazilian
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hegemonic ambitions. A shift from cooperative hegemony (medium-level of realist elements and
a high degree of institutionalism) towards unilateral hegemony (strong realist elements and a low
degree of institutionalism) would also threaten Brazil’s success in promoting its interests in the
region and strengthening its regional influence. In the future, Brazil could also revive its interests
in gaining a permanent UN Security Council seat and spreading its influence to the global and
extra-regional level, much as India has under its Hindu Nationalist Party administration.
Comparisons of global and regional foreign policy strategies are difficult for many reasons.
First of all, even though the current international system, for now still under American hegemony,
and the three regions in which the three cases under study operate have unipolar systemic structures, regional hegemons still have some restrictions. As stated previously, unlike global
hegemons, regional hegemons have to operate under an international hierarchy, and external interference in regional dynamics is always possible while the global hegemon does not face such a
threat although it confronts significant global (Russia and China) and local (North Korea and Iran)
challenges and resistance in some of its regional interventions, as in Southeast Asia and MENA.
Interference or engagement of the global major powers in the region may create constraints and
opportunities for the regional powers as well as secondary and tertiary states. Global penetration
shapes regional order and threatens the autonomy of regional hegemons. Hence, external interference in regional dynamics is not desired by regional hegemons. However today, as Buzan (2004)
argues, the global hegemon has a security role in all regions, which is observed in the three cases
under study at different levels. The global hegemon is present in South America and South Asia
with its security and economic interests, and to an extent in Southern Africa with its humanitarian
interests. Moreover, since those regional hegemons have to operate under both international and
regional hierarchies, regional hegemons have to establish some kind of harmony between the two
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spheres, which also affects regional dynamics and limits their control and influence over their
regions (Prys 2010, 482). Regional hegemons also do not generally have the economic clout and
resources of the global hegemon and therefore are somewhat more limited in building unrivaled
economic and trade dominance even on the regional levels. Nevertheless, India and China are both
rising on this score.
Conclusions
The observed pattern in the motivations, strategies and behaviors of regional
hegemon/great power case studies can be classified based on their regional conditions and material
capabilities, the alliance factor, and overlapped membership.
Based on the findings, it seems reasonable to conclude that when a region is relatively
unstable and insecure and a regional hegemon is relatively more dominant in its sphere of influence
in comparison to other regional hegemons, the regional hegemon tends to pursue a unilateralist
hegemonic strategy. On the other hand, when a region is relatively more stable and peaceful, free
of regional threats to the regional hegemon, and the regional hegemon lacks the capability to
achieve its goals unilaterally, the regional hegemon pursues a multilateralist and institutionalist
foreign policy strategy. These conditionalities do not seem to apply in the same way for global
hegemons.
Alliance factors do not have much influence on the foreign policy choices of regional
hegemons. Even though regional hegemons have some sort of interaction as well as bilateral and
in some cases multilateral relations with the global hegemon, allied or not, regional hegemons seek
to limit external influence on regional dynamics in order to establish their leadership in their respective regions. The factor of overlapped membership influences the foreign policy choices and
focus of a regional hegemon. While non-overlapped regional hegemons have more focus on their

151
own regions with their high concentration on regional dynamics, overlapped hegemons, on the
other hand, not only attempt to increase influence within their region, but also seek to engage
actively in the overlapped region. Indeed, an overlapped regional hegemon tries to develop
stronger relations with countries in its overlapped region to influence the dynamics of the overlapped region.
Based on the assessment of regional great powers, it also seems reasonable to conclude
that when such as power operates in a relatively peaceful and stable regional setting, regional great
power follows a multilateralist foreign policy strategy while when a regional great power is a
member of a conflict-prone and insecure region, it can be expected to follow a unilateralist foreign
policy strategy. Due to the multipolar regional structure, relative material capabilities do not influence the behaviors or strategies of regional great powers as much as they influence the behaviors
of regional hegemons.
The evaluation of the alliance factor shows that alliance with the global hegemon influences regional great power strategies. If a regional great power is allied with the global hegemon,
the regional great power allows external penetration in regional dynamics while an un-allied regional great power seeks to limit external involvement. The overlapped membership factor, on the
other hand follows the pattern of regional hegemons and affects the choices and strategies of regional hegemons both in its own region and its overlapped region.
The findings on the comparison between global and regional hegemonic behaviors suggests
that while there are similarities between regional and global hegemonic strategies and behaviors,
differences in global and regional structures and conditions pose limitations on such a comparison.
Despite of restrictions and limitations, we witness similarities in global and regional hegemonic
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behaviors and foreign policy strategies when there are similarities in systemic/regional conditions
and dominance patterns of regional and global hegemons.
Lastly, the study appears to partially support the applicability of HST to a regional-level
analysis to understand the conflictive and cooperative behaviors of regional powers. Regional conditions seem to have a significant effect on the relationship between the existence of a regional
hegemon and the stability of the regional order. Still, it seems reasonable to conclude that even
though some of them are more successful in doing so than others, regional hegemons and regional
great powers, with some exceptions, appear to have paramount interest in promoting stability and
providing public goods in their regions.
Agenda for Future Research
This study offers several possible avenues for future research. One path for further study
would be the investigation of China’s regional hegemony and its comparison with Russia’s regional hegemony. The power capabilities and influences of these regional hegemons are beyond
their regions.
This research examined unipolar and multipolar regional orders since the focus of the study
was regional hegemons and regional great powers. Moreover, cases under study were selected
from different types of regional hegemons and regional great powers based on the typology developed by the study. Further study can fill in some deficiencies of my study by taking two paths.
First of all, Northeast Asia’s bipolar regional structure from 1990-2001 and unipolar regional
structure since 2001 can be analyzed as two distinct periods. China’s relationship with Japan in
bipolar regional structure and Japan’s responses to China’s hegemony could be examined comprehensively. Moreover, both Russia and China are un-allied but overlapped cases, and the analysis
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of their relationship with the global hegemon would give new insights to test the alliance factor
more in depth and provide further test for the generalizability of the findings on the alliance factor.
Even though this study analyzed the relationship between India and its challenger Pakistan
briefly, a more in-depth study might examine and compare the relationship between a regional
hegemon and its challenger in different regions. Future study might test the effects of the alliance
factor by taking into consideration the challenger’s alliance with the global hegemon and its effects
on regional dynamics. Japan in Northeast Asia and Pakistan in South Asia are important secondary
states which influence regional dynamics. Even though both countries have alliances with the
global hegemon, their degree of alliance and their benefits from it differ greatly. In my study, I
have addressed only the effect of a regional hegemon’s alliance with the global hegemon; however,
the case study section revealed that a challenger’s alliance with the global hegemon also needs to
be explored in future studies.
Besides regional hegemons and regional great powers, the strategies and behaviors of limited regional powers also deserve attention since the literature does not focus on such countries as
limited regional powers. Of the potential cases, Venezuela is an important one since it dominates
oil reserves in South America. Venezuela’s relationship with the regional hegemon and regional
great powers as well as its responses to Brazilian economic hegemony could be investigated. As
such, analyzing the Venezuelan case could provide new insights on the strategies and behaviors of
regional hegemons in dealing with a limited regional power. Since my focus is regional hegemons
and regional great powers, I did not explore behaviors and strategies of limited regional powers
but primarily concentrated on the behaviors of regional hegemons in conflictive and cooperative
situations.
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Lastly, studying the similarities and differences in global and regional hegemons’ strategies
and behaviors with a focus on a specific period would provide advantages to the researcher in
drawing more general conclusions. This study addressed the similarities and differences between
the strategies and behaviors of global and regional hegemons and covered three different periods
of global hegemonic behaviors while the case study section focused on post-Cold War period to
assess regional hegemonic behavior. I should stress that this comparison posed limitations and
difficulties, especially because of the Cold War Period’s systemic conditions. Therefore, future
research would benefit more from comparing global and regional hegemonic strategies with a focus on a specific period.
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
After the Cold War, International Relations has seen a resurgence of interest in the study
of regional powers. Scholars have been paying increasing attention to regional powers as important
actors in world politics and studying their foreign policy, but few if any studies have discussed the
behaviors of regional power comprehensively and comparatively. The purpose of this study is to
gain a better understanding of regional power foreign policy strategies and behaviors by analyzing
them comprehensively and comparatively. Unlike previous studies on cooperation and conflict
within regions, this study focuses on the reasons for the strategic tendencies and motivations of
regional hegemons and great powers and their effects on regional cooperation and conflict. Moreover, departing from Hegemonic Stability Theory, this study also aims to explore similarities and
differences between regional and global hegemonic foreign policy strategies. With its focus on the
post-Cold War period, this study uses an overall aggregate data analysis of regional cooperation
and conflict to test region-level adaptation of HST propositions. This study also uses the method
of structured and focused case comparison to present an in-depth analysis of different types of
regional powers including Brazil (an allied and non-overlapped case), South Africa (an un-allied
and non-overlapped case), India (an un-allied and overlapped case), Germany (an allied and non-
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overlapped case), and Iran (an un-allied and overlapped case). The aggregate data analysis supported region-level adaption of HST propositions which revealed that HST is applicable to regional-level. Consistent with the aggregate data analysis, the comparative case study method illustrates that even though regional conditions, material capabilities, and the overlapped membership
factor affect foreign policy strategies and behaviors of a regional hegemon, regional hegemony
plays a stabilizing role with its intervention in regional conflicts and promotion of regional cooperation.
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